The combined nominal gross domestic product (GDP) of the 11 Brics countries is about $35.18 trillion, only 8.6 per cent higher than the US GDP of $32.38 trillion. It represents 28 per cent of global GDP at market exchange rates, although its share rises to about 41 per cent when measured at purchasing power parity. China alone accounts for $20.85 trillion. Indeed, the combined GDP of the other ten members is only about 69 per cent of China’s GDP. Thus, Brics possesses enormous aggregate economic weight, but it is concentrated in China. That weight is not matched by comparable trade, investment or institutional integration.

Economically, Brics remains a collection of 11 economies rather than an integrated bloc. It was not conceived as a common market or customs union. It provides a forum for engagement among emerging economies, including countries with difficult bilateral relations. However, it has yet to develop effective mechanisms for improving market access, addressing non-tariff barriers or resolving economic disputes. Nor has it secured better access to the Chinese market for Indian goods or helped India reduce its trade deficit with China. 

Intra-Brics merchandise exports reached $1.17 trillion in 2024, over thirteen times their 2003 level. This was about 4.7 per cent of global merchandise exports — modest compared with the grouping’s share of population and output. It represented over 30 per cent of the members’ combined exports, but much of that commerce cannot be attributed to Brics and would probably have occurred without it. India’s purchases of Russian oil, Chinese machinery, and Gulf crude are obvious examples. Moreover, the trade is highly concentrated and organised largely around China. 

For India, trade with Brics members has increased access to essential imports far more than access to export markets. Investment among the members also remains modest compared with their collective economic size. The economic importance of the member countries should not be mistaken for economic benefits created by Brics. 

China is likely to remain the economic centre of Brics. That dominance limits the prospects of deeper integration. A common Brics currency would either be dominated by the yuan or require institutions and political trust that the grouping has not yet developed. Bilateral settlements in national currencies may expand selectively, but persistent trade imbalances make an effective bloc-wide arrangement improbable. For India, replacing dependence on the dollar with dependence on the yuan would hardly enhance monetary autonomy. 

Brics has produced one significant institutional achievement: the New Development Bank. Over a decade, it has approved around 120 projects involving nearly $40 billion. Though modest compared with established multilateral development banks, it provides an additional source of infrastructure and sustainable-development finance. The $100-billion Contingent Reserve Arrangement has never been drawn upon, although it offers a potential financial safety net. 

None of this is to underplay Brics’ potential. It may provide strategic gains that cannot readily be quantified. Its past need not determine its future. But future relevance will depend on whether members can overcome their divergent interests and translate summit declarations into measurable improvements in trade, investment and financial cooperation. Until then, Chidambaram’s question cannot be answered merely by citing their combined population and GDP.