On October 27, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz arrived in Singapore with a message that Europe needs closer partnerships in the Indo-Pacific. Trade, underwater infrastructure, and industrial artificial intelligence may seem like separate policy areas. In fact, they expose the same problem: Europe’s prosperity depends on networks that it cannot secure or shape alone. 

Singapore has spent decades making itself indispensable to a global economy in which it has little control over the behavior of the major powers. Germany might be seeking to learn from that example.

At his meeting with Singaporean Prime Minister Lawrence Wong, Merz proposed an interregional trade agreement between the European Union and the 12 members of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Together, the two groups account for more than a third of global trade. Wong and Merz also agreed to deepen defense cooperation and industrial AI collaboration under an updated strategic partnership, building on their original agreement from 2024.

The EU already has trade agreements with CPTPP members Singapore and Vietnam in Southeast Asia, as well as with other CPTPP members, including Japan, Canada and New Zealand. Singapore specifically has had a free-trade agreement with the EU since 2019, followed by a digital trade agreement that took effect in February 2026. According to the European Commission, bilateral trade in goods between the EU and Singapore reached 47.8 billion euros in 2025. 

Merz’s proposal to link the EU more closely with the CPTPP would therefore need to do more than connect markets that already have bilateral FTAs. Its value would lie in addressing gaps between existing agreements, aligning trade rules where possible, and making it easier for businesses to operate across countries with different regulatory systems. But an interregional agreement would be politically difficult to negotiate.

In the realm of security, Merz and Wong focused on undersea cables, which carry more than 99 percent of international data traffic. These cables support financial transactions, cloud services and government communications, yet they are vulnerable to both accidental damage and purposeful sabotage. 

Singapore has taken a leading role in efforts to improve cooperation on critical underwater infrastructure. In May 2026, on the sidelines of the Singapore-hosted Shangri-La Dialogue, 17 countries launched the Guiding Principles for Underwater Infrastructure Defense Exchanges (GUIDE), a voluntary framework for sharing information and exploring practical defense cooperation. Singapore was one of the founding members; European countries, among them France and Italy, accounted for over half of the 17 states that joined at the launch. Germany joined GUIDE during Merz’s visit.

Much underwater infrastructure is built, maintained, and repaired by private operators, making coordination between governments and industry essential. GUIDE provides a framework for countries to share information and improve their response to disruptions that cross national borders. The damage to five undersea cables in the Gulf of Finland in December 2024 illustrated the stakes. Such incidents can disrupt communications, incur substantial repair costs, and leave governments struggling to establish responsibility. For Singapore, a major hub for international data routes, and Germany, whose economy depends on secure digital connectivity, closer cooperation is therefore a practical necessity.

Industrial AI offers a third example of why EU-Singapore connections matter. Germany has deep manufacturing and engineering expertise; Singapore has invested in digital infrastructure and the application of AI. 

At their joint press conference, Wong said Singapore was focusing less on building frontier models than on deploying AI in areas such as logistics, healthcare, finance, and advanced manufacturing. The National AI Strategy 2.0, launched in 2023, aims to make the city-state a leading center for AI solutions by 2030. It emphasizes adoption across industry, government and research.  

That focus complements Germany’s industrial base. Cooperation could help manufacturers introduce robotics and automation, improve productivity, and bring AI into existing production systems. But the test will be whether cooperation produces systems that businesses actually use. 

The EU has spent years declaring the Indo-Pacific a strategic priority. Europe cannot eliminate its dependence on international markets, digital infrastructure, or foreign technology, and it cannot expect Singapore to become an alternative to the United States or China. Singapore’s strength lies in maintaining connections across competing centers of power, not in choosing one at the expense of the others. Europe could learn from that approach. Singapore cannot solve Europe’s strategic problems, but it already has the trade agreements, security partnerships, and technological ambitions that Europe says it wants to build on.

Merz has put forward a vision for closer transregional cooperation, but he has yet to explain how the EU would turn closer CPTPP ties into a workable trade framework. GUIDE remains a voluntary platform, and industrial AI cooperation has yet to demonstrate its economic impact. Merz’s Singapore visit set out the ambition, but the work of implementation has barely begun.