Few would have pictured Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar sharing a stage with his Azerbaijani counterpart, Jeyhun Bayramov, after Baku’s public backing of Islamabad during the India-Pakistan crisis of 2025.

Following the terrorist attack at Pahalgam on April 22, 2025, Azerbaijan was one of the few countries that did not publicly condemn the attack. After a telephone conversation with the Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar on April 26, Baku issued a statement, expressing concern over the “recent tensions between India and Pakistan” and stressed the need to “refrain from unilateral actions in such a volatile situation.” Then, after India launched Operation Sindoor on May 7, Azerbaijan explicitly condemned the Indian military strikes, saying they harmed civilians. It expressed solidarity with the people of Pakistan.

Against this backdrop, Jaishankar’s visit to Baku on October 23 – the first standalone visit by an Indian external affairs minister since 2018 – when he held talks with Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev and Foreign Minister Bayramov, marks an important step toward repairing strained bilateral ties.

At the joint press conference, Bayramov acknowledged that India and Azerbaijan “had different viewpoints on different issues,” before going on to describe discussions with Jaishankar as “very long and positive and fruitful.” Jaishankar echoed this sentiment, describing the discussions as “focused and forward looking” with both sides exchanging views on “various aspects” of the bilateral relationship and discussing important “regional and global developments from a strategic perspective.”

While no agreements were signed, both sides agreed to deepen cooperation in the oil and energy sector, expand trade and investment, and exchange commercial and business delegations. They also agreed to strengthen regular political consultations and exchange high-level visits. During the visit, Jaishankar reportedly raised the issue of cross-border terrorism, security, and common threats. Notably, including “cross-border terrorism” brought New Delhi’s primary security friction with Pakistan directly into the bilateral conversation, despite Islamabad’s close ties with Baku.

Jaishankar’s visit was not an isolated diplomatic gesture, but rather the latest in a series of moves to accelerate a thaw in India’s ties with Azerbaijan. Jaishankar’s visit to Baku was a follow-up to the meeting between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Aliyev on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit at Bishkek in August-September this year.

Jaishankar’s visit was immediately preceded by a visit by the Indian Minister of State for External Affairs Kirti Vardhan Singh to Baku, where he led the Indian delegation for the 7th Summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) held on October 15.

High-level diplomatic contact between New Delhi and Baku was restored in April this year, when India’s Secretary (West) Sibi George visited Baku for the 6th round of the India-Azerbaijan Foreign Office Consultations. The visit came less than a year after Baku condemned India’s military strikes on Pakistan. According to an Indian Ministry of External Affairs media release, the issues discussed included “trade, technology, tourism, pharmaceuticals, energy, culture, people to people exchanges and [the] fight against cross border terrorism.” The previous foreign office consultations were held in 2022.

According to an Indian media report, Azerbaijan resumed crude oil exports to India in September 2025, after a 10-month break caused by pricing issues that led to a halt in supplies. India-Azerbaijan bilateral trade has steadily dropped from $1,882 million in 2022 to $1,435 million in 2023, $958 million in 2024 and just $400 million in 2025. In the first 9 months of 2026, bilateral trade has already reached $600 million, Bayramov said.

It is important to understand the regional geopolitical context in which the thaw in New Delhi-Baku ties is playing out. India’s engagement in the South Caucasus has historically been weighted towards Armenia, Azerbaijan’s adversary in the decades-long Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This has been a persistent irritant in India-Azerbaijan ties.

Meanwhile, Armenia has emerged as India’s strongest partner in the region – especially through defense cooperation – in recent years, driven largely by mutual concerns over an Azerbaijan-Pakistan-Türkiye nexus. The signing of the U.S. brokered peace agreement aimed at ending the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in August 2025 paved the way for New Delhi to separate its relations with Baku from its position on the conflict, without risking derailing ties with Yerevan.

The evolving regional landscape has further accelerated this alignment. Nascent signs of rapprochement between Azerbaijan and Türkiye are evident, with the recent bilateral agreement to promote cooperation in academic engagements.

In September 2025, Armenia and Pakistan also established diplomatic relations after over 30 years of non-recognition by Islamabad. As more extra-regional actors come to play an active role in shaping the South Caucasus’ future, New Delhi is fast realizing it has more to lose by not engaging in multi-directional diplomacy with all actors.

Interestingly, Jaishankar’s visit comes at a time when Azerbaijan’s school hijab ban has strained Baku’s ties with one of its closest partners, Türkiye. After Baku announced a headscarf ban on September 21, Türkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan implicitly criticized the move at the U.N. General Assembly, calling it an assault on fundamental freedoms. The resulting criticism from Erdogan and other Türkish officials prompted a sharp response from Baku, triggering a rare diplomatic showdown between partners who describe themselves as “One Nation, Two States.”

Although Jaishankar’s visit was likely planned well in advance and unrelated to this sudden friction, the trip coincided perfectly with these shifting regional dynamics. It opens a valuable window for rapprochement, granting both nations greater geopolitical maneuvering space in light of New Delhi’s fraught relations with Ankara.

Another reason why New Delhi is looking to revive ties with Azerbaijan is to accelerate work on the International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC). Originally proposed in 2000, the project sat dormant for years until New Delhi recently signaled interest in reviving it, as an alternative to the conventional Suez Canal route amid growing vulnerability in global maritime chokepoints. Azerbaijan, which serves as the land bridge for the Western Route of the INSTC, will play a crucial role if New Delhi wants this route to become a dependable commercial artery. In this context, Baku agreeing to “closer coordination” on INSTC is a welcome development for New Delhi.

Yet, India’s ‘”de-hyphenation” policy may not automatically translate to a reset in ties. Because a formal peace treaty remains absent, the agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia amounts to little more than a fragile truce. If the conflict persists or reignites, New Delhi will find itself increasingly intertwined in turbulent regional security dynamics.

Moreover, whether this relationship broadens or stagnates will also depend to a large extent on Baku’s willingness to accommodate New Delhi’s concerns regarding Pakistan and Kashmir.

Azerbaijan has been a consistent and vocal supporter of Pakistan’s position on the Kashmir issue, most notably at multilateral forums such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Azerbaijan has consistently backed statements and communiques within the OIC and its contact group on Jammu and Kashmir, which condemned India’s actions in Kashmir.

Azerbaijan will be hosting the 2027 OIC Summit, and New Delhi will closely scrutinize how it frames the Kashmir issue in the grouping. Any overtly provocative framing is likely to adversely impact the future trajectory of India-Azerbaijan diplomatic and economic ties.

The trust deficit between the two sides is deep-rooted, and the recent rapprochement seems unlikely to bridge the big ideological differences between the two nations.

Nevertheless, engagement is a positive step, and a practical reflection of New Delhi’s ‘multi-alignment’ approach towards foreign policy.