In the Fijian capital of Suva this week, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and his Fijian counterpart, Sitiveni Rabuka, signed two new security agreements. The agreements form part of a period of hyperactive diplomacy by Canberra in the Pacific, which has also included a series of new partnerships with Tuvalu, Nauru, Papua New Guinea (PNG), and Vanuatu.

The first agreement with Fiji was the Vuvale Union, an expansion of the Vuvale Partnership signed in 2023. This new union moves to a more permanent framework for collaboration, with stronger commitments to economic integration, workforce mobility, education, skills development, and investment. It establishes new initiatives such as the Vuvale Skills Hub and expanded training and labor mobility pathways, which demonstrate a shift from simply encouraging cooperation to creating the institutions that support it. The Union also establishes closer day-to-day collaboration between government agencies, making the relationship more deeply embedded than the consultation-based approach of the partnership. 

Yet it was the second agreement signed in Suva that has the potential to be the more consequential. The new Ocean of Peace Alliance, also known as the Veitacini Treaty, is both a defense pact and a broader statement about the future of Pacific regional security. Primarily driven by Rabuka, the treaty is not limited to Fiji and Australia; it is open to accession by other Pacific Island countries. 

At its core, the Veitacini Treaty is a mutual defense agreement. Its most consequential provision – Article 6 – states that an armed attack on one party in the Pacific “would be dangerous to each other’s peace and security” and commits both sides to act against the common danger according to their domestic legal processes. While the wording is not identical to NATO’s collective defense clause, it clearly creates a much stronger security obligation than previous bilateral agreements between Australia and individual Pacific Island states.

Beyond this, the treaty also establishes mechanisms for consultation and security cooperation. Its Article 5 commits both countries to consult whenever developments threaten the sovereignty, peace, or stability of either state. Other sections focus on defense cooperation, visiting forces arrangements, democratic values, and dispute resolution through dialogue and the “Pacific Way” – the ethos of the Pacific Islands Forum. The treaty deliberately frames security in regional and Pacific terms rather than simply as a bilateral military arrangement.

This is why the treaty is open to future expansion. It draws upon the ideals of the 250 Strategy for the Blue Pacific Continent and its focus on regional solidarity and partnership. At present, alongside Australia and Fiji, only New Zealand, PNG, and Tonga have militaries within the region, but given these ideals of regional solidarity and collective defense, other states may see it in their interests to join and find non-military ways to contribute. 

For Fiji, the treaty is historically important because it is the country’s first formal alliance agreement. Fiji has traditionally pursued a more non-aligned foreign policy, balancing relationships with Australia, New Zealand, China, and other regional powers. With Rabuka being more sympathetic to Australia and Western allies than his predecessor, Frank Bainimarama, he appears to have decided that the current regional environment requires closer strategic cooperation with Canberra. 

Here the agreement must also be understood in the context of growing geopolitical competition in the Pacific. In recent years, China has expanded its diplomatic, economic, and security presence across the region. Beijing’s 2022 security agreement with the Solomon Islands was particularly significant because it raised concerns in Canberra and Washington about the possibility of future Chinese military access in the South Pacific. Since then, Australia has accelerated efforts to rebuild and deepen relationships with Pacific states through aid, labor mobility programs, infrastructure investment, and security agreements.

At the same time, both Australia and Fiji have tried to avoid presenting the treaty as explicitly anti-China. The treaty language itself stresses peace, consensus decision-making, and respect for sovereignty. This reflects the political reality that many Pacific Island countries still want economic engagement with China while also maintaining strong structural ties with Australia and New Zealand.

There is nevertheless a risk that closer security arrangements with Australia could draw Fiji – and potentially other Pacific countries – into wider strategic rivalries. Clearly Fiji assessed that risk and concluded that the benefits outweigh it. Yet the longer-term success of the Ocean of Peace Alliance rests with whether and how it evolves to work in the interests of Pacific Island countries. 

Security in the region is not only framed in terms of traditional defense, but also includes economic development, disaster resilience, and climate change mitigation. This may complicate the idea of “collective defense” in Canberra’s eyes, but it is central to giving the idea of the “Pacific Family” substantive weight.