The continuing ethnic strife in Indian border state of Manipur is the outcome of many factors, including the Indian government’s policy on ceasefires with militant outfits.

The conflict that erupted in Manipur three years ago between the majority Meitei and Kuki-Zo communities has claimed more than 250 lives and displaced over 60,000 people. The strife has now widened to entangle Naga communities against the Kuki.

A major reason for the lingering conflict is the involvement of militant outfits from all three communities – Meitei, Kuki-Zo, and Naga. An overwhelming majority of these groups have ceasefire agreements with the government, which the government kept extending without any result.

The extension of ceasefires with rebel groups has been part of the government’s multipronged policy to resolve militancy in the northeastern region.  The ceasefires are a prelude to agreements after which militants join the mainstream and surrender their weapons to the government.

That the policy has borne results in the Northeast is evidenced by the sharp decline of insurgency-related incidents over the past decade, which prompted Home Minister Amit Shah to recently remark that the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, considered a draconian law that gives extraordinary powers to security forces in counterinsurgency operations, would be revoked from large parts of the Northeast next year.

The tactic of prolonging the ceasefires has produced results in the states of Assam, Tripura, Meghalaya, and Mizoram. The continuous extension ensures that rebel groups cannot return to the jungles to renew the campaign against the government.  Eventually, their bargaining power with the government also diminishes, with the result that agreements are accepted without the key issues being resolved.

This is what happened with the pro-talks faction of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), which signed a ceasefire agreement with the government in 2011. More than a decade of negotiations followed without any result till the end of 2023, when an agreement was finally hammered out. The government rejected most of the key demands of the outfit.

However, the same policy has led to a deadlock in Nagaland and proved to be counterproductive in Manipur.

The National Socialist Council of Nagalim – Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) demands “symbols of sovereignty” for Nagaland, such as a separate flag and constitution, a condition that has so far not been accepted by the government. Still, the deadlock has not fueled unrest in Nagaland as the state has a homogenous population with an overwhelming majority of Nagas. There were sporadic clashes between the groups, as happened over a few days in Dimapur in 2008 between NSCN-IM and NSCN-Khaplang. But they never dragged on for too long to necessitate special measures by the government.

Manipur, by contrast, has a heterogeneous population, with the majority Meitei inhabiting Imphal Valley ringed by the Kuki-Zo and Naga tribes in the hill districts.  The state is unique in that it has the highest number of overground armed outfits among all states in the country. There are 25 outfits among the Kuki-Zo communities that signed the Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreement in 2008 with the government, besides some more groups that have no ceasefire with the government. The government has launched operations to neutralize some of these groups.

In addition, two Naga outfits, including the NSCN-IM, are active in Manipur besides the Meitei separatist groups and two new militias in Imphal Valley. More than 10,000 overground militants from all the communities are estimated to be active in Manipur.

The Kuki-Zo groups demand the creation of a union territory encompassing all areas in the state inhabited by members of their communities.  The demand has been opposed by the other communities as it would mean dividing the state and also encroaching on the territories of other ethnic groups. It was the same rationale that led the government to reject the NSCN-IM’s demand for a Greater Nagalim, bringing together all Naga-inhabited territories in the northeastern region under a single administrative mechanism.

Amid the continuing ceasefires were also persisting reports that rebel groups were violating ground rules. This is evident not only in Manipur but also across Nagaland and Assam. The government’s failure to enforce the ground rules ensured that the rebel cadres had the freedom to impose taxes, engage in business, and carry weapons, which should have been under “lock and key” in the designated camps.

Clashes between rebel groups in the ceasefire had erupted on several occasions earlier, resulting in killings and arson. The best example comes from Assam’s hill districts of Karbi Anglong and Dimas Hasao, which witnessed at least four such violent eruptions between 2002-2007, with the worst being the clashes between two rebel outfits – United People’s Democratic Solidarity (UPDS) and Dima Halam Daogah (DHD) – that ended up involving some sections of the Karbi and Dimasa communities in Karbi Anglong. The situation compelled the security forces to raid a camp of the DHD at Dhansiri subdivision in the district.

These episodes should have prompted the Indian government to draw lessons and fine-tune its ceasefire policy in Manipur. But that did not happen.

There was reason for the government to be extra cautious in Manipur, given the large number of armed groups active in the state and the quantum of weapons with them. An additional factor that adds to the complexity of conflicts in this state is the ongoing illicit trade with Myanmar on a wide range of commodities, from timber to narcotics. Rebel outfits have competed among themselves to control the routes, causing turf wars and violence on a scale reminiscent of the early nineties.

Abrogation of the ceasefires in Manipur may not be an option for the government as it could spark greater violence. Nor can agreements be firmed up easily as the rebel groups have been unwavering in their demands.

The government is caught in a bind and has deployed special forces for operations, resulting in seizures of weapons and apprehension of militants at regular intervals. But there is no indication so far of normalcy returning to the embattled state soon.