“Let me be clear that we cannot fight the next war like we fought our last,” said late General Bipin Rawat, then the Indian Army chief, in 2018. Rawat, who later became India’s first Chief of Defense Staff (CDS), spoke of four transformation efforts that he initiated in the Indian Army, one of which was the creation of Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs) for swift strikes. This was finally realized on July 1, when the Indian Army formally raised the first five IBGs and a Fire Support Group with long-range firepower. The new units are under the Eastern Command’s 17 Mountain Strike Corps facing China and located in two states, Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim. This enables the Indian Army to launch a blitzkrieg option. The China focus underscores where India sees its biggest threats.

The process is expected to take a year to complete. Eventually, IBGs will also be created in other sectors.

IBGs are meant to be agile, all-encompassing strike formations that can mobilize at a short notice of 12-48 hours. An IBG has around 5,000 personnel, which places it between a typical brigade (3,000-3,500) and division (10,000-12,000). Headed by a major general-rank officer, the key factor is that an IBG has all elements incorporated— infantry, armor, artillery, air defense, logistics, and so on—making it self-sufficient for swift action. Each IBG would be tailored on three Ts — Threat, Terrain and Task — as stated by officials in the past.

The doctrine and concept of IBGs have been extensively test-bedded and validated under the Yol-based 9 Corps on the Western front and the 17 Mountain Strike Corps during exercises. However, the larger modalities and the formal sanction from the government were quite delayed, so much so that in January 2025, then-Indian Army Chief Gen. Upendra Dwivedi said that a timeline was difficult to give because “wherever the bureaucracy gets involved, it will take time.” He added: “We are hopeful that by 2025, we will either create this IBG or cancel this project completely.” With the formal government sanction letter now issued, the process has commenced.

Eastern Focus

The initial ideation on IBGs was heavily focused on Pakistan, especially given its continued support for cross-border terrorism and the prevailing “no war, no peace” scenario.

However, the initial IBGs raised are facing China and that too on the eastern front, and not the Ladakh sector where the two countries have seen significant tensions since the 2020 standoff that is still underway. It is in sync with India’s recent focus on strengthening military posture and defenses in this axis given China’s increased activity and provocations in the eastern sector, and its advantage in asymmetry in areas facing the 3 Corps area. The topography and terrain in the region being mountainous makes swift mobilization a challenge for India, and an IBG gives the maneuverability for quick shallow ingress to hold swathes of territory in case of any misadventure by the People’s Liberation Army.

The one resounding lesson from the 2020 standoff with China is that Beijing only talks when it is at a disadvantage and the other side holds leverage. China started serious negotiations toward ending the standoff only after the tactical actions by the Indian Army along the North and South Banks of Pangong Tso in late August 2020. The 3,488-km-long Line of Actual Control (LAC) between India and China is divided into three sectors — the western sector spanning Ladakh, the middle sector comprising Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand, and the eastern sector, comprising Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh.

The IBGs are organized on similar lines to the Combined Arms Brigades (CAB) of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), created as part of its 2017 reforms. Like the IBG, the CAB consists of 5,000-6,000 personnel and brings together various strike and support elements. Since the 2020 standoff, the PLA has deployed CABs in Tibet facing Eastern Ladakh.

The IBGs also find mention in the Indian Army’s Land Warfare Doctrine 2018, which states that when forced to prosecute a conventional war, all combat operations will function as IBGs, under the command of a combined arms operational headquarters.

Upgrading “Cold Start”

The IBGs fit into the overall transformation of the Indian Army in tune with the realities of changing warfare. This effectively formalizes and also upgrades the long espoused “Cold Start” doctrine. Its existence was acknowledged by Rawat in January 2017. Cold Start was formulated from the debacle of Operation Parakram, launched after the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001. The Army’s strike formations that were deep in the hinterland took weeks to mobilize, resulting in a cascade effect — loss of the element of surprise, the international community stepping in, and Pakistan resorting to nuclear signaling. Cold Start was seen as an instrument to make space for swift conventional operations under the nuclear overhang of the subcontinent.

The IBGs follow several other transformative initiatives rolled out by the Army in the last year, post-Operation Sindoor in May 2025. They include Rudra Brigades, Bhairav Battalions, Shaktibaan drone regiments and Divyastra drone batteries for the Regiment of Artillery. Last September, current Army Chief Gen. Dhiraj Seth, then a lieutenant general and heading the Southern Army Command, observed that with the Rudra brigade, the “time has come to change the cold start to cold strike one.” The IBGs certainly give a new impetus to this.

As witnessed during Operation Sindoor, the days of large-scale mobilization are over, with conflict moving to long-range, precision strikes from standoff ranges. Large-scale boots on the ground and ground maneuvers across borders seem passé from recent conflicts. However, given the uncertainty in the escalation ladder in the subcontinent, IBGs may be the answer if the need for a quick ground retort were to arise.

While Rawat’s initiative as army chief finally takes shape, his bigger effort, the reorganization of the military into Integrated Theater Commands as India’s first CDS, is now moving forward.