According to information released by the government of Russia’s Sakhalin Oblast on October 13, a delegation from China’s Heilongjiang Province, including government officials and entrepreneurs, recently visited Iturup Island (Etorofu in Japanese). The island is part of the Southern Kuril Islands, known as the Northern Territories in Japan, which are currently under Russian de facto control, though Japan claims sovereignty over them.

The Chinese group’s visit led to an immediate expression of dissatisfaction from Tokyo, with Japanese Foreign Minister Motegi Toshimitsu declaring it “absolutely unacceptable.” In response, Beijing stated that it “consistently advocates for respecting and upholding the outcomes of the victory [of World War II].” A Japanese media outlet suggested that this reflects “a coordinated stance between China and Russia regarding the Northern Territories issue and a joint approach in dealing with Japan.”

The islands in question were under Japanese control until they were occupied by the Soviet Union at the end of World War II. The Japanese government has maintained its claim ever since. Tokyo has made repeated attempts to advance negotiations on the territorial issue with Russia by leveraging economic cooperation and investment. Ultimately, however, these efforts have not yielded satisfactory results.

Despite possessing abundant fishery and mineral resources, the economic potential of these islands remains largely untapped due to the lagging economic development of the Russian Far East, inadequate infrastructure, and high transportation costs. In 2022, Russia announced the establishment of a special economic zone on the islands to foster economic growth. If Chinese enterprises become more involved in the economic development of the Southern Kuril Islands in the future, it would not only exert political pressure on Japan but could also strengthen Russia’s de facto control over these islands.

Although maps currently published in China label these islands as Japanese territory under Russian occupation, Beijing generally avoids taking an explicit stance on their sovereignty. In August 2026, following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Iturup Island, the Chinese and Russian ambassadors to Japan co-authored an article stating: “The preservation of historical memory of World War II and its outcomes is particularly important for our countries.” This appeared to imply China’s acknowledgment of the status quo without an overt declaration. Some Japanese media outlets perceive Beijing as shifting away from the position it held during the later Mao era and moving toward the Russian side.

It remains unclear whether this delegation’s visit was intentionally orchestrated by Beijing. However, given that the delegation included officials from the Heilongjiang provincial government, the visit clearly had at least the tacit approval of the authorities. 

Over the past few months, Japanese lawmakers from various political parties have visited Taiwan, and most notably, a group of 27 Japanese parliamentarians arrived in Taiwan around the same time as this delegation’s visit. Beijing typically views such actions as an infringement upon China’s territorial sovereignty. Consequently, this visit by the Chinese delegation may well be a countermeasure by Beijing against Japan.

One disadvantage for Japan is that it is involved in territorial or maritime disputes with nearly all of its neighbors. These disputes currently remain largely a matter of bilateral relations between Japan and the respective countries involved. However, the Chinese delegation’s visit to the Southern Kuril Islands against the backdrop of deteriorating China-Japan relations may signal that Beijing has deployed a diplomatic card against Japan that had previously received little attention.

The deepening of China-Russia relations has further complicated this issue. In recent years, the frequent joint patrols conducted by Chinese and Russian military aircraft and naval vessels in the vicinity of Japan have drawn concern from Tokyo. 

Concurrently, China and Russia have aligned their historical narratives. In May 2025, the two nations issued a joint statement commemorating their respective victories in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the Great Patriotic War, while also pledging to strengthen bilateral cooperation and uphold the authority of international law. The statement characterized both China and Russia as “pivotal forces in the fight against militarism and fascism” and asserts their commitment to “defending the outcomes of the Second World War” and resisting any “resurgence of militarism.” This aligns with Beijing’s accusations that Japan is pursuing a “new-type militarism.” 

Given these shared historical perceptions, China and Russia can be expected to coordinate more closely on historical and security-related issues in their diplomatic approaches toward Japan.

However, it remains highly likely that Beijing will continue to avoid formally recognizing Russian sovereignty over the islands. This is not only because China needs to maintain diplomatic maneuvering room vis-à-vis Japan, but also because it seeks to avoid becoming entirely tethered to Russia’s interests.

Japan’s response, meanwhile, is constrained by both its own policy toward Russia and the state of its relations with China. Japan’s continued imposition of sanctions against Russia makes any substantive improvement in its relations with Moscow in the near term highly unlikely. At the same time, there are no signs of any meaningful improvement in Tokyo’s relations with China. Against this backdrop, it is difficult for Japan to effectively counter the activities of China and Russia in the region.

More significantly, should China begin to actively engage in economic activities or even pursue military cooperation with Russia on the islands, the issue could gradually evolve from a bilateral dispute between Japan and Russia into a new variable affecting China-Japan relations and, by extension, the security landscape of Northeast Asia.