The secret February reconnaissance

According to the declassified files, a British military adviser visited India from February 8–16, 1984, at the request of Indian authorities. Working alongside the Indian “Special Group”, the adviser conducted a covert ground reconnaissance of the Golden Temple complex.

An internal communication of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office dated February 23, 1984, states that the British military advisor spent eight days with the Indian security forces and conducted a ground reconnaissance of the Golden Temple complex in Amritsar on February 10, flown there by a special helicopter.

“It was clear to the officer that the Indians had not given much thought to how they should root out the extremists, beyond applying the ‘sledgehammer to crack a nut’ principle. With his own experience and study of this kind of problem, he was able to advise the Indians of a realistic and workable plan which Mrs Gandhi approved on her return from Moscow on February 16.”

It adds that the British reaction to the Indian request can have done Anglo/Indian relations nothing but good; it was therefore vital that there should be no leak about the visit. “If there were, would be extremely embarrassing for both sides, and, if the leak sprang from us, the Indians would never forgive us; if and when the Indians put the plan into operation and if it went wrong, they should not be able to pin any blame on us,” it adds.

The missing warning

The documents further reveal that the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office sent a missive on May 11, 1984, to Delhi, requesting prior warning of military intervention at the Golden Temple and emphasising the importance of such forewarning in the context.

“In the end we were not given any specific briefing the day the actual invasion of the Golden Temple took place (5 June, 1984). However (name redacted) then Indian equivalent of our Intelligence Co-Ordinator, asked (named redacted) in Delhi on 13 June, 1984 to express his gratitude to the prompt and helpful response which resulted in the (redacted portion) report,” it says.

“Although some recommendations were used, the main concept changed once the Indian Army took over. A frontal assault was attempted, using some of the Indian Special Forces and casualties were suffered. (Redacted portion) emphasised that the large number of deaths was not the result of poor implementation of the plans, nor of any deficiency in the plans but was due to the Army’s decision to do it their own way,” the document adds.

The documents also reveal that the then British High Commissioner in New Delhi was of the view that the Indian government’s request for assistance demonstrates the close relationship between Britain and India.

“A positive response would earn a good deal of credit; at the same time Mrs Gandhi would find it hard to understand a refusal. (Name redacted) has been consulted and confirms that he can provide a suitably qualified and experienced officer short notice to provide the advice sought,” the document says.

Archived documents also reveal that there had been previous UK military contact in 1982 with the Indian Counter-Terrorism Unit (the “Special Group”). But it was well before the situation at Golden Temple became critical, and involved different personnel. There is no suggestion in the later files relating to this visit two years earlier that it had touched at all on issues in the Punjab, the files say.

The Indian Intelligence Coordinator visited London in mid December 1983. But no request for military advice was made during this visit.

Why the main concept changed under Indian Army

The UK documents state the purpose of the British military advisor’s visit was to advise Indian Counter Terrorist Team commanders on the concept of operations that they were already working up for action in the temple complex, including tactics and techniques.

“However, I can confirm that the report makes clear that the military officer’s instructions were that no UK manpower or equipment should be offered beyond the visit of this single military adviser. His assessment for the Indian authorities also made clear that this type of operation should only be put into effect as a last resort when all other courses of negotiation had failed,” the documents say.

The UK officer’s report back to the UK authorities stated that the main difference between the original Indian plan and his advice was that the original plan was based on obtaining a foothold within the south complex and fighting through in orthodox paramilitary style. With a view to reducing casualties, the UK military adviser recommended assaulting all objectives simultaneously, thereby assuring surprise and momentum.

The advice given to the Indian authorities identified sufficient helicopters and the capability to insert troops by helicopter as critical requirements for this approach. The UK advice also focused on command and control arrangements and nighttime coordination of paramilitary with Indian Special Group forces. The UK advice also focused on command and control arrangements and nighttime coordination of paramilitary with Indian Special Group forces.

“ A quick analysis by current UK military staff confirms that there were significant differences between the actual June operation and the advice from the UK military officer in February. In particular, the element of surprise was not at the heart of the operation. Nor was simultaneous helicopter insertion of assault forces to dominate critical areas. The paper on the operation made public by the Indian authorities on 13 June 1984 makes clear that it was a ground assault, preceded by a warning, without a helicopter-borne element, which became a step-by-step clearance supported by armour and light artillery,” the British documents say.

Some time after the UK military adviser’s visit, the Indian Army took over lead responsibility for the operation, the main concept behind the operation changed, and a frontal assault was attempted, which contributed to the large number of casualties on both sides, the declassified file says.

“There is some other corroboration in the files of both a shift in the overall Indian command arrangements, and a change in the plan from that discussed with the UK military adviser in February…the UK military adviser’s report suggested that the Indian intention in February 1984 was to pursue a police/paramilitary operation and avoid use of the Army,” the file reveals.