On June 23, 2026, South Korean Prime Minister Kim Min-seok walked onto the campus of Tsinghua University in Beijing, where he had earned a law degree in 2010. “I believe that my time studying at Tsinghua University will remain one of the most beautiful memories of my life, forever cherished and held close to my heart,” he told his hosts. Kim had flown in from Seoul on early morning flights, he recalled, just to make it to class on time. (Kim has since resigned from office to become the chair of the ruling Democratic Party.)

Three weeks earlier, Lao President Thongloun Sisoulith had stood in the dormitory room at the Central Party School where he had lived during a month-long program in 2000. “Though the campus has undergone some changes,” he said, “the places where I lived and studied remain just the same.” 

Both leaders returned to a Beijing alma mater within three weeks of each other. They are not alone. 

Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, the president of Kazakhstan, studied at the Beijing Linguistic Institute (now known as the Beijing Language and Culture University) in 1983-84 and speaks fluent Mandarin. In April 2026, Le Minh Hung took office as Vietnam’s prime minister; in 1996, he had completed a training course on market economy and financial analysis at Shanghai University of Finance and Economics. 

With four neighborhood countries now having top leaders who have studied in China, does this mark a new phase in Chinese educational diplomacy in its periphery, or is it little more than a biographical curiosity?

Three forces explain the growing cohort of Asian leaders who spent time at Chinese schools.

First, Chinese universities have risen sharply in global rankings. In the 2026 U.S. News Best Global Rankings, Tsinghua – a public institution that traces its roots back to 1911 – placed sixth globally, accompanied by 10 other mainland institutions in the top 100. A degree from a top institution in China now carries weight both at home and abroad.

Second, and related, education investment has grown steadily. China has maintained public education spending at or above 4 percent of GDP since 2012, a benchmark enshrined in national policy and actively monitored. This is a dividend from decades of economic growth directed back into the education system. Between 2021 and 2024, China invested $539 billion in higher education, building what is now the world’s largest higher education system. 

As investment has grown, access has widened, too, for both Chinese and foreigners. Chinese government scholarships – including the Silk Road program for students from Belt and Road partner countries – cover tuition, accommodation, living expenses, and medical insurance. In the 2024-25 academic year, 380,000 international students from 191 countries were studying in China, with Asian students making up 61 percent of that figure.

What does this education actually deliver? Familiarity with the Chinese language and social context, for one. Tokayev’s Mandarin is evident in his public engagements. Thongloun’s Party School curriculum covered party theory and state policy. Kim studied Chinese law, giving him insight into China’s regulatory framework. 

Educational history also shapes present-day engagement. Kim’s alumni visit, for example, provided a forum for discussing bilateral cooperation with Tsinghua’s Party Secretary Qiu Yong.

None of this moves the needle on core foreign policy. Vietnam’s “four nos” defense policy and Kazakhstan’s multivector diplomacy are structural features of their geopolitical positions, not likely to change because of a leader’s personal biography. Le Minh Hung has continued Vietnam’s balancing act with Washington and hedging in the South China Sea. Tokayev has maintained Kazakhstan’s close ties with Moscow while deepening economic ties with Beijing. These foreign policy patterns predate these specific leaders – and their Chinese education – and continue today.

But studying in China does matter for diplomacy. Leaders with Chinese training have a better understanding of which institutions produce which decisions, and how China’s leaders think about specific issues. Thongloun said his Party School experience “laid a crucial foundation for leading national development” – what he took from Beijing was the logic behind China’s development approach, applied in Laos.

Should exchanges continue to expand, the share of senior officials in China’s periphery with Chinese training will keep rising. They will act according to their national interests, but with a better grasp of Beijing’s internal drivers. Whether that accumulation eventually shifts policy, or only the quality of communication, is the question to watch.