Pakistan’s air defense system shot down eight drones after they entered the country’s airspace from Afghanistan on September 23. Four drones were shot down near the border at Torkham and four were shot down near Kohat in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. In response, Pakistan struck 10 locations in Afghanistan that were being used to launch and store drones by the Afghan Taliban.

This growing use of drones has added a dangerous new dimension to an already fragile Afghanistan-Pakistan relationship. On its western border, Pakistan now faces a two-pronged security challenge: first, the direct use of drones by the Afghan Taliban against Pakistani security positions and other targets, and second, the transfer or facilitation of drone technology to affiliated militant groups such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), enabling them to conduct attacks against military check posts and other targets inside Pakistan. What was once primarily a tool of surveillance, propaganda, and battlefield observation has evolved into an instrument capable of extending the reach, precision, and lethality of militant violence. 

The Afghan Taliban began using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in 2016, initially for propaganda purposes. Over time, however, their use expanded into operational roles, including reconnaissance, surveillance, and the delivery of explosives. Between February 27 to March 15, 2026 the Afghan Taliban claimed responsibility for 15 drone attacks in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and Islamabad. 

The Afghan Taliban procures its drones from a mix of sources, including commercially available platforms, systems obtained through regional networks, and locally modified or assembled equipment. This has made drone technology more accessible and harder to control. 

The Afghan Taliban’s 313th Battalion, associated with the Haqqani network, is using one-way attack drones, referred to as kamikaze drones. The Afghan Taliban drones are launched from Kandahar, Nangarhar, Paktia, and Paktika, reducing the distance to targets in Quetta, Peshawar, Islamabad, and Waziristan in Pakistan. Recently, the Afghan Taliban have reportedly acquired anti-drone systems and are preparing to deploy them at the 205th Corps in Kandahar and near Spin Boldak to counter Pakistani drones along the border.

The concern becomes more acute when this capability is viewed alongside the TTP and other militant groups operating from Afghanistan into Pakistan. These groups have shown considerable adaptability in adopting new technologies, especially drones. This low-cost technology gives militant groups capabilities once associated primarily with conventional military forces. For Pakistan, the challenge is therefore not simply the presence of drones, but the growing ease with which this technology can be acquired, adapted and deployed by multiple actors across the border.

Pakistan has so far effectively intercepted cross-border drone incursions from Afghanistan. However, it needs to take further concrete steps, as drone use is becoming a persistent feature of the Afghan Taliban’s military strategy against Pakistan. 

The most worrying possibility is not necessarily that Afghanistan will develop a large drone fleet. It is the multiplication of small, relatively cheap systems. A conventional military platform represents a significant investment and is therefore used selectively. Small unmanned systems can be acquired in larger numbers and employed repeatedly. They can observe a security position, identify a target, test air defense responses, and also carry an explosive payload. Even when they cause limited physical damage, they can create disruption, fear, and uncertainty. Pakistan therefore needs to treat counter-drone capability as a central component of national security rather than as a specialized military requirement.

There has already been movement toward domestic drone production. Pakistan’s defense industry and armed forces have experience with UAVs for surveillance, reconnaissance, and combat roles. Indigenous production is important because reliance on foreign suppliers can become a vulnerability during a prolonged crisis. A country facing an evolving drone threat needs the ability not only to build systems but also to modify, repair, and upgrade them according to its own requirements.

Pakistan also requires a layered counter-UAV architecture. The first layer should be detection. Conventional radar does not always provide an adequate answer against small, low-flying drones, particularly in cluttered urban or mountainous regions like Pakistan’s western tribal borderlands. Pakistan therefore needs a combination of short-range radar, electro-optical and infrared sensors, radio-frequency detection, and other technologies capable of identifying unusual aerial activity. 

The second layer is neutralization. Depending on the threat, this could involve electronic warfare, communications jamming, spoofing, and conventional interceptors. No single technology is likely to be effective against every type of drone. A layered approach is therefore essential for Pakistan to counter the layered threat. 

Pakistan should also invest in artificial intelligence and data analysis. A modern counter-drone system should learn from repeated attacks: launch patterns, flight routes, frequencies, operating times, and target selection. The objective should be to move from reacting to drones after detection toward predicting likely attacks before they occur. Therefore, working in this direction should be a priority of Islamabad. 

Airports, power stations, military facilities, government buildings, oil installations, and major communication centers all require appropriate protection. Border management must consequently become more technologically sophisticated. Pakistan’s long and difficult western border cannot be secured through conventional fencing and physical posts alone. Sensors, surveillance aircraft, drones, ground-based monitoring systems, and rapid-response units need to operate as one network. Intelligence sharing between civilian and military agencies is equally important.

At the same time, Islamabad must avoid allowing the drone issue to become part of a permanent cycle of escalation with Kabul. Retaliatory action may be presented as necessary when attacks occur, but military responses alone cannot produce a stable border. Each strike carries the possibility of further retaliation, civilian casualties, and a broader deterioration in relations.

The Afghan Taliban therefore needs to come to the negotiating table. Dialogue does not require Pakistan to abandon its security concerns or accept attacks against its territory. On the contrary, negotiations should be used to establish verifiable commitments by the Afghan Taliban: Afghan territory must not be used for attacks against Pakistan; militants should not receive access to military technology in Afghanistan; mechanisms for investigating cross-border incidents should be created; and both sides should maintain direct communication during crises.