The Diplomat author Mercy Kuo regularly engages subject-matter experts, policy practitioners, and strategic thinkers across the globe for their diverse insights into U.S. Asia policy. This conversation with Dr. Eric Setzekorn – historian and author of “On the Brink: A Military History of Taiwan” (Naval Institute Press 2026) with over two dozen academic articles published in  Parameters, the Journal of American-East Asian Relations, and the Journal of Military and Strategic Studies – is the 532nd in “The Trans-Pacific View Insight Series.”  The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government.

Identify the main milestones in the history of Taiwan’s military.

Since 1949, Taiwan’s military has undergone tremendous changes, but two pivotal moments are especially notable.

The 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis demonstrated that a coherent and well-trained military in Taiwan was increasingly capable of a wide range of sophisticated operations. The poorly organized and equipped soldiers of 1949 would likely have been swept aside by PLA forces if there had been an invasion of Taiwan, but by the end of the 1950s Taiwan’s military had over a dozen well-trained divisions, hundreds of jet fighters, and professional officers. 

The enactment of a National Defense Act in 2002 was the culmination of a profound transformation during the 1990s from one-party KMT dominance into a non-partisan, civilian-led defense structure that reflected Taiwan’s democratic culture. The 2002 National Defense Act stipulated that the defense minister must be a civilian and required regular reports on military policies and combat readiness to the Legislative Yuan. The act also provided specific guidance regarding the political status of military personnel, noting, “The ROC Armed Forces shall remain neutral from individual, regional and party affiliations in accordance with the Act.” 

Explain how and why the institutional identity of Taiwan’s military moved away from a “party-army” conception.

After 1949, and well into the 1990s, Taiwan’s military was integrated into the KMT political party as a core element of the party’s authoritarian rule over Taiwan. During his nearly half-century as the leader of the KMT, Chiang Kai-shek kept close control over the military through stifling surveillance, required party membership for military officers, and incorporated KMT propaganda into military training. These political linkages meant that military roles often spilled over into numerous domestic functions, such as policing during the period of martial law from 1949 to 1987, often referred to as the White Terror. 

Beginning in the 1980s, and continuing into the 2000s, the military has become an apolitical institution that reflected the cultural sophistication and vibrant democracy of Taiwan. Despite this steady evolution, the legacies of Taiwan’s authoritarian past continue to influence the relationship between Taiwan’s military and society.

How did Taiwan’s military become more adaptable after the rise of Xi Jinping and China’s increasingly aggressive posture toward Taiwan?

Taiwan’s adaptation to the rise of Xi Jinping and increasing PLA aggressive behavior has taken two primary forms: increasing civil-military unity, and an operational shift in military planning.

Since 2020, there has been a significant increase in the negative attitudes of Taiwanese towards China, and this has led to increased public support for additional military spending and an extension of military service requirements. Public opinion polling conducted after the visit of U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi in August 2022, and subsequent Chinese exercises, revealed that 85 percent of respondents favored extending compulsory military service. Public concern is also reflected in steady increases to defense budget after 2016, with military spending more than tripling from 2016 to 2027. 

During Tsai Ing-wen’s first term (2016-2020), her administration promoted what became known as the Overall Defense Concept (ODC). The ODC emphasized what many Taiwanese and American defense analysts label “asymmetric warfare.” Supporters of the ODC argued that acquisitions should focus on fielding smaller, less expensive defense systems. For Taiwan’s Navy, for example, the ODC approach stressed fielding of smaller vessels, such as stealthy corvettes armed with short-range anti-ship missiles, and naval mines, rather than conventional surface ships such as frigates and destroyers. 

Describe two plausible scenarios for a potential Taiwan Strait conflict.

The massive expansion of the PLA Navy, with associated increases in air force and army capabilities, has enabled Chinese political leaders and PLA military planners to envision multiple scenarios for military action against Taiwan. 

A sudden Chinese attack on one of Taiwan’s outlying islands would force Taiwan’s military to respond in areas that would strain air and naval support. Taiping Island is 930 miles (1,500 km) from Taiwan’s main port of Kaohsiung, making it far outside the range of any Taiwanese combat aircraft. Taiwan faces a similar situation on Pratas Island, which is roughly 250 miles (415 km) southwest of Kaohsiung, and only 150 miles from the Chinese coast. 

In a blockade scenario, powerful PLA naval surface forces, likely including an aircraft carrier, could close shipping lanes near Taiwan. Submarines would provide Taiwan with a potent force to challenge PLA naval deployments and defend sea lanes of communication (SLOC). 

In December 2014, the Taiwan began a program to develop an Indigenous Defense Submarine (IDS), and in April 2018, the United States approved the export licenses needed for U.S. companies to sell naval technology to Taiwan for the submarine program. Construction of the first submarine, the Hai Kun, began in 2020, and by mid-2023 it was launched for testing and certification. In total, Taiwan plans to build eight IDS submarines by the mid-2030s.

Looking ahead, assess key factors that will likely shape the future development of Taiwan’s military and their impact on Taiwan-U.S. relations.

In the past 50 years, American support to Taiwan has often been measured in terms of arms sales, but Taiwan’s domestic arms industry has become increasingly sophisticated and efficient. In particular, the development of a wide range of anti-ship missiles and drones has decreased dependence on the United States and made Taiwan’s military more capable. For vital naval systems, Taiwan’s National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST), and Taiwan International Shipbuilding (CSBC) have become the primary suppliers of mines, missiles, drones, and warships for Taiwan. 

A second significant development is the shift from a primarily bilateral U.S.-Taiwan security relationship to a possible trilateral U.S.-Taiwan-Japan security relationship. Japan is heavily reliant on sea lanes that pass through both the South China Sea and Taiwan for roughly 90 percent of its energy imports and 40 percent of its maritime trade. Japanese political leaders have begun adjusting expectations about Japanese involvement in a Taiwan conflict. In November 2021, [former Prime Minister] Abe Shinzo made remarks that any contingency related to Taiwan would be an emergency for Japan and for the U.S.-Japan security alliance, and current Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae has stated that a Taiwan conflict would be “a survival-threatening situation” for Japan.