Israel’s parliamentary election on October 27 posed a consequential test of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s leadership – and a moment for India to consider how resilient its expanding relationship with Israel is to political change.

The election was the first national vote since the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack. Since then, public debate has centered on the government’s security failures, the wars that followed, and questions of accountability. Netanyahu also faces an ongoing corruption trial; the charges remain allegations, not findings of guilt. The election’s outcome will depend not only on which party wins the most votes, but also on who can assemble a governing coalition – a defining feature of Israeli politics for decades.

For New Delhi, the central question is whether the interests and institutions underpinning bilateral cooperation are strong enough to sustain momentum under a different Israeli government. The close personal rapport between Netanyahu and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has given the partnership visibility, but it is not its sole foundation. Since establishing full diplomatic relations in January 1992, India and Israel have expanded cooperation across defense, agriculture, water management, technology, and trade. These accumulated ties give both countries practical reasons to continue working together beyond the political fortunes of their current leaders.

Defense cooperation is a particularly clear example of the relationship’s depth. The Barak-8 air-defense system, jointly developed by India’s Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO)and Israel Aerospace Industries, illustrates how collaboration has moved beyond a simple buyer-seller relationship. Both sides are also exploring the possibility of co-producing Israeli-manufactured defense items such as Iron Dome air defense systems and Tamir interceptor missiles in India.

Between 2021 and 2025, India was Israel’s largest destination for arms exports, accounting for 29 percent of Israel’s sales worldwide. Such engagement is likely to continue despite India’s push for defense indigenization. In June 2026, Amir Baram, director general of Israel’s Ministry of Defense visited India and met senior Indian officials to discuss strengthening defense-industrial cooperation, including technology sharing and joint projects. Earlier, in November 2025, the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation.

These developments do not guarantee that every project or initiative will proceed unchanged under a new government. They do, however, create established channels and a record of cooperation on which future leaders can build.

A change of government in Israel should therefore not make it a herculean task to take the relationship forward. Both countries have developed bilateral mechanisms and ongoing engagement in areas including trade and commerce as well as military and defense cooperation. These working relationships can help preserve continuity through a political transition, even if a new Israeli administration reviews particular priorities, timelines, or agreements. The policy challenge for both sides will be to turn that institutional continuity into practical results, rather than relying only on personal rapport or broad declarations.

Economic ties offer an important opportunity to maintain and expand the relationship. During Modi’s February 2026 visit to Israel, the two governments discussed expanding cooperation in defense technology, artificial intelligence, and cybersecurity, while pursuing a free trade agreement. Negotiations are at an advanced stage. The India-Israel Bilateral Investment Agreement, signed in September 2025 as a precursor to the anticipated FTA, entered into force in July 2026. To facilitate trade, the State Bank of India also raised the possibility of using the rupee for trade with Israel in January 2026.

Bilateral trade between the countries reached approximately $3.93 billion in 2025-26. A breakthrough in FTA talks could provide a stronger framework for trade and investment and help lift economic ties to a new level. It should therefore be in the interest of any future Israeli government to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion and sign a mutually beneficial agreement at an opportune moment. 

A new Israeli government under a different leader could bring a change in diplomatic style and emphasis. It might seek to repair Israel’s international standing or place renewed weight on improving relations with traditional Western partners, particularly the United States and European countries whose ties with Israel have been strained by the Gaza war and deteriorating security in the West Bank. These possibilities would not necessarily imply a retreat from engagement with India. Israel has reason to maintain partnerships beyond its established relationships, while India values Israeli expertise and technology in areas relevant to its security and development. Any new leadership would need to establish its own working relationship with New Delhi, but the existing bilateral agenda offers a basis on which to do so.

India’s approach will also be shaped by the wider regional environment. New Delhi has important interests across West Asia, including energy security, trade and maritime routes, and the welfare of nearly 10 million Indian citizens in the Gulf. It also maintains relationships with the Arab Gulf states and Iran, a longstanding partner. Escalation involving Israel and its neighbors, as witnessed this year, could put these interests under pressure and make India’s balancing act more difficult. Regional instability could also hamper connectivity and economic cooperation initiatives such as the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEEC) and the India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States (I2U2) framework. Both these projects have made no progress due to regional tensions, though neither has been completely shelved by the countries involved.

This context makes diplomatic calibration essential. India can deepen practical cooperation with Israel while continuing to support dialogue, regional stability and a political horizon for Palestinians, including a two-state solution. Such an approach reflects the need to protect Indian interests across a diverse region; it does not require New Delhi to treat bilateral cooperation as a substitute for wider diplomacy. For Israel, sustaining ties with India is valuable because the relationship spans several sectors and retains scope for further growth.

The likely trajectory is continuity, though not without qualifications. Netanyahu’s return as prime minister would preserve a familiar political channel, while a new government could bring different priorities and require a period of relationship building. In either case, established defense cooperation, the prospect of closer economic ties, and the growing convergence of interests in areas such as agriculture, water management, AI, renewable energy, cybersecurity, people-to-people ties, educational partnerships, and science and technology provide a foundation for continued engagement.

The election may change the political setting in which India-Israel relations operate, but it is unlikely by itself to erase the interests and institutional links that sustain them. India’s task will be to translate continuity into concrete cooperation while retaining the diplomatic flexibility needed to navigate a volatile region.