The United Nations has been undergoing its most significant overhaul in history, the UN80 initiative, which aims to review mandates, reduce costs, and consider structural changes across the system. This is partly due to mounting arrears, of which more than 95 percent of what is owed to the regular U.N. budget is owed by the United States, historically the organization’s largest financial contributor. In January, Secretary-General António Guterres warned that the U.N. faced “imminent financial collapse,” with long-lasting impact on its global operations.

As the United States becomes a less reliable funder, a tempting assumption has taken hold, that China will step into the space left by Washington. The logic appears straightforward. Against the backdrop of China-U.S. competition and Beijing’s growing ambition in global governance. China routinely presents itself as a defender of true multilateralism. It has become the second-largest contributor to the U.N. regular and peacekeeping budgets and has sought greater representation in international organizations. As Washington turns away from the U.N., Beijing seemingly has both the ambition and the opportunity to take its place.

But China’s pursuit of greater influence should not be mistaken for an attempt to replace the United States. Beijing wants a greater voice at the U.N., but it has shown little willingness to assume the open-ended responsibilities that U.S. leadership has historically entailed. Its engagement is better understood as cautious, selective, and bounded by what Chinese officials repeatedly described as acting “within its own capacity” (力所能及).

China’s rhetorical commitment to the United Nations is real. Chinese officials consistently call for upholding the U.N. Charter, strengthening the organization’s authority, and defending a U.N.-centered international system. Yet its defense of the U.N. is neither novel nor unconditional. Since recovering its seat in 1971, Beijing has regarded the U.N. as an important arena in which it can constrain U.S. hegemony, defend state sovereignty, and amplify the voice of developing countries. Its current rhetoric intensifies this established position rather than marking a wholesale transformation in China’s international role. As the United States has withdrawn from international bodies and reduced multilateral funding, Beijing has used this language to contrast its professed support for multilateralism with Washington’s unilateralism.

Moreover, the other side of the rhetoric is often neglected. Alongside Beijing’s call for stronger U.N.-centered multilateralism, China routinely promises to contribute according to its capabilities. The “within its capacity” narrative presents China as a responsible power while preserving considerable discretion over the scale, timing, and destination of its commitments. 

China’s financial record reflects precisely this balance. Its assessed contribution has risen dramatically alongside its economic weight. Under the scale of assessments adopted for 2025 to 2027, China accounts for around 20 percent of the U.N. regular budget, ranking just behind the U.S. at 22 percent. China is also the second-largest contributor to U.N. peacekeeping. These figures are frequently cited as evidence that Beijing is poised to displace Washington at the organization. 

But assessed contributions tell only part of the story. They are obligations calculated according to an agreed formula, not straightforward measures of a government’s willingness to finance international leadership. The sharper test of Beijing’s intentions is voluntary funding, particularly the earmarked contributions, through which donors can earmark this money for particular organizations, countries, sectors, or projects, allowing them to translate funding into policy influence. Much of the U.N. system, particularly its development and humanitarian operations, largely depends on earmarked contributions. 

The United States has long been the largest source of earmarked funding, whereas China has not come close to matching it. According to data from the U.N. System Chief Executives Board for Coordination, Washington provided approximately $10.5 billion in earmarked contributions in 2024. China provided about $225.5 million, just over 2 percent of the U.S. total. Although Beijing’s earmarked contributions have grown, they have increased from a low base and remain modest relative to the size of its economy and its mandatory payments. 

The difference is not merely quantitative. Beijing also allocates its voluntary funding selectively. It favors institutions and programs that align with its policy priorities or create opportunities to demonstrate its preferred approach to development cooperation. Research also finds that Beijing tends to avoid organizations already heavily shaped by U.S. funding and personnel. This selectivity allows China to pursue influence where the expected political returns are greater while limiting the costs of direct competition. 

China’s personnel presence exhibits a similar tension. Beijing has sought to increase the number of Chinese nationals working in international organizations and has campaigned for Chinese candidates to lead specialized agencies, such as the Food and Agriculture Organization. Its efforts have produced visible results, but progress in selected organizations and leadership positions should not be mistaken for institutional dominance. In 2025, 1,641 Chinese nationals worked across the U.N. system, compared with more than 5,074 U.S. nationals. China therefore remained underrepresented in U.N. staffing relative to the size of its population and financial contributions. A small number of senior appointments cannot immediately create the deep pool of international civil servants, technical specialists, diplomatic networks, and institutional experience accumulated by established powers over decades.

China’s foreign aid bureaucracy also constrains a rapid expansion of multilateral financing. The China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA) was established partly to improve coordination, but other ministries and financial institutions retain important implementation and funding responsibilities. CIDCA’s lower bureaucratic rank and lack of implementation authority could generate continued friction with other ministries, especially the Ministries of Commerce and Foreign Affairs. This fragmented structure is better suited to negotiating bounded projects and designated funds than to supplying large amounts of flexible financing across the U.N. system. 

There is also an identity constraint. China continues to present itself as the world’s largest developing country and a partner in South-South cooperation. This positioning allows Beijing to claim solidarity with the developing world and resist expectations that its international obligations should mirror those of the U.S. Replacing Washington financially would weaken that distinction and invite demands that China assume responsibilities it has long argued should remain differentiated.

China’s domestic economic constraints further reinforce this cautious approach. Fiscal pressures and competing domestic priorities make it politically less attractive for Beijing to assume substantially larger international expenditures, particularly when many of the benefits would be diffuse and difficult to demonstrate to its domestic audience. 

None of this means that the U.S. retreat will leave China without new opportunities. Beijing does not need to replace U.S. funding dollar-for-dollar to gain influence. As U.N. agencies become more financially vulnerable, even relatively modest Chinese contributions may acquire greater political weight. Institutions working in areas aligned with China’s priorities may attract additional attention or project funding. Beijing, for example, pledged $500 million to the World Health Organization after the United States announced its withdrawal. China’s selective engagement could therefore change the distribution of resources across the U.N. system without resolving its underlying financial crisis.

This prospect should concern both U.N. officials and U.S. policymakers. Washington’s withdrawal will not simply transfer responsibility to its principal competitor. It will create gaps that Beijing can exploit selectively but is unlikely to fill. China can benefit from a U.S. retreat without repairing the damage that retreat causes. It may acquire a larger voice in selected institutions while the wider system loses budgets, programs and operational capacity. 

Nor would the result necessarily be a Chinese-led United Nations. Leadership requires more than supportive rhetoric or a high assessed contribution. It also requires a willingness to provide resources across institutions, including when the immediate political returns are uncertain. Beijing has so far shown little appetite for that role.