Nuclear-capable cruise missiles rose from the soon-to-be commissioned North Korean guided missile destroyer, Kang Kon (52), as Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un watched on July 3. The launch was conducted less than two weeks after the Korean People’s Army Navy (KPAN) formally commissioned the 5,000-ton destroyer Choe Hyon (51), North Korea’s largest domestically produced surface warship. 

These two events underscore indications that North Korea is engaging in a concerted effort to build up its navy. At the Choe Hyon’s commissioning, Kim declared that the KPAN had entered a “new era” after “over 70 years” of naval stagnation.

These developments indicate that North Korea has modified its hierarchy of defense priorities by elevating the importance of the KPAN. The rapid construction of large surface combatants, new naval bases, and modernization of existing bases are evidence of this elevation. If continued, this trend could disrupt allied naval dominance and complicate U.S. nuclear deterrence efforts. That, in turn, could encourage the Kim regime to act more aggressively, increasing the probability of a conflict breaking out on the Korean Peninsula. Fortunately, the United States, South Korea, and Japan can still counter this developing threat. 

Comparing the troubled history of North Korea’s navy in the 2010s with more recent developments provides evidence of the growing threat and insights into how to respond.

The Rise of the KPAN

North Korea’s focus on naval development can be traced back to 2023 when Kim signaled his desire for greater emphasis on KPAN growth and modernization to increase its involvement in military strategy and operations. Three years later, in February 2026 at the 9th Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea, Kim unveiled his new five-year plan and future defense priorities. 

The five-year plan calls for upgrading all military bases, further strengthening the southern border, and modernizing conventional weapons so that they may become “world-class.” In March, Kim stated that the KPAN needs to build two vessels of a size equivalent to the Choe Hyon or larger every year, with the goal being at least 12 large surface combatants by the early 2030s. 

These goals further expanded in June 2026 when Kim directed his regime to accelerate the design and construction of a new 10,000-ton guided missile cruiser and build additional naval bases. Concurrently, the North appears to be expanding shipyards at Chongjin and Nampho to better facilitate Kim’s yearly shipbuilding quota.

If the gains in basing and industrial production are realized, sustained, and institutionalized, Pyongyang may be able to sustain the current pace of surface combatant production. Fielding a formidable surface combatant force could undermine U.S. and South Korean sea control around the Korean Peninsula. It would also be a significant break from the past, when the KPAN struggled to build and field even smaller vessels.

Troubled Corvettes of the Past

Before the shift toward large naval surface combatants and the subsequent commissioning of the Choe Hyon in June 2026, the KPAN was focused on building, outfitting, and commissioning two different classes of corvettes. The most capable were the two vessels of the Amnok class. Displacing around 2,000 tons, those two vessels feature a reduced radar cross section, and at least one’s armament includes a 100mm main gun, anti-submarine warfare rocket launchers on the bow, missile launchers for anti-air missiles and possibly anti-ship missiles, and a close-in weapon system (CIWS) similar to the Soviet AK-630. 

Patrol Ship No. 661, the only publicly seen Amnok-class corvette, made its debut in state media in August 2023. Naval News reported at the time that most weapons and sensors onboard were “severely” obsolete in comparison with Western and other Asian designs. However, the vessel marked a major milestone for the KPAN as No. 661 was, at the time, one of its most capable ships.

Around the same time, Pyongyang built and fielded two other corvettes of the significantly less capable Tuman class. They lack extensive armament and are posited by some analysts to serve in a support role for the more capable Amnok-class vessels.

Despite the capability differences between the Amnok and Tuman classes, both suffered from lengthy construction and outfitting timelines, along with apparent setbacks. For instance, No. 661 was first spotted under construction in 2011, entered service in 2017, and finally had its capabilities debut in August 2023. It seemingly took more than a decade for the ship to undergo construction, outfitting, and sea trials. 

Tuman-class vessels also suffered from long completion timelines, with initial construction beginning in 2011 and completing in 2013. But then reconstruction of one vessel started in 2014, with reconstruction of the other starting in 2017, indicating significant issues with initial design, construction, or weapons loadout. Despite no state media announcement that either Tuman-class vessel entered service, reporting indicates at least one is likely on the active register. 

The troubled history of these ships contrasts sharply with the much more successful development of the Choe Hyon-class destroyers.

New Horizons With New Destroyers

The Choe Hyon’s construction efforts began around February 2024 at Nampho shipyard on North Korea’s western coast. It was launched successfully in April 2025 and sea trials began afterward. The final testing of seaworthiness appeared to occur in May 2026, while its eventual commissioning was on June 23, 2026 — less than two and a half years after construction started.

The increased speed of construction is alarming, as are the Choe Hyon’s combat capabilities. After undergoing modifications throughout 2025 and possibly into early 2026, the vessel’s primary weapon system is now a mixture of 88 large, medium, and small diameter vertical launch system (VLS) cells that can fire cruise and surface-to-air missiles. The Kim regime regularly touts the ability of the vessel to launch “strategic” nuclear-tipped cruise missiles. If this is true, the Choe Hyon provides yet another vector, in addition to ground-launched and submarine-launched missiles, by which North Korea can threaten U.S., South Korean, and Japanese military bases and regional cities with nuclear weapons. 

The Choe Hyon also fields a 127mm main gun on the bow, torpedo launchers, decoy-launching systems, and two CIWS that resemble Chinese Type 730 rotary cannons, likely guided by the installed four-faced phased array radars or an integrated fire-control radar. Additionally, it is armed with eight inclined launchers concealed within the central superstructure amidships as well as eight ready-to-fire short-range missiles on an apparatus which closely resembles the Russian Pantsir-M CIWS. 

The Choe Hyon could have protection against higher velocity threats, such as some anti-ship missiles, via the Pantsir-M’s 57E6M-E missiles if truly armed with a Pantsir-M or a close derivative. That would also indicate that Pyongyang’s relationship with Moscow has provided tangible defense benefits. If the technology underlying the Choe Hyon’s CIWS came from Chinese and Russian-exported systems, then Beijing and Moscow could be providing the terminal layer of defense for an arm of Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons capabilities. These CIWS could potentially disrupt American, South Korean, or Japanese efforts to prevent a North Korean nuclear launch – a threat will be further amplified as more vessels in this class enter active service.

Pyongyang’s already robust and rapidly growing relationship with Moscow is a part of a larger web of security cooperation among the “axis of aggressors” – China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. This cooperation is unlikely to end anytime soon and brings significant benefits to its members, as detailed in a new book by Bradley Bowman, Elaine Dezenski, and RADM (ret.) Mark Montgomery.

Raised From the Bottom

The second Choe Hyon-class vessel, the Kang Kon, was launched unsuccessfully in May 2025 as Kim Jong Un watched. Satellite imagery revealed that a side launch was attempted, as opposed to the Choe Hyon’s drydock launch method. When a ship is launched via drydock, the chamber where the ship was constructed is flooded with water, floating the ship in a controlled manner. A side launch is a riskier process whereby a ship is constructed on land and then is slid into the water on its side via oiled slideways. 

The change from the Choe Hyon’s drydock launch and the Kang Kon’s side launch was possibly due to differences between the facilities at Chongjin and Nampho, where the Choe Hyon was launched. A lack of relevant experience with side launches and a rush to finish the project may have also contributed to the Kang Kon ending up with its starboard side facing the bottom and a portion of its bow remaining on the slipway.

In a rare moment of candor by North Korean state media, the accident was quickly announced, and “inexperienced command and operational carelessness” were given as the underlying reasons for the mishap. State media further revealed that the hull was damaged via “low-impact holes” at the bow section during the accident.

However, the accident would prove to be a relatively minor setback. The Kang Kon was quickly raised and towed to another shipyard at Rajin, further northeast. From there, on June 12, 2025, the KPAN ceremoniously “relaunched” the ship. It took North Korea only around 22 days to raise the ship, relaunch it, and begin sea trials. While it is unclear if the Kang Kon fielded its full complement of weapon systems at that time, it is clear the construction timeline remained short despite the accident.

The KPAN built and fielded their largest-ever naval surface combatant in a little over two years and will likely come close to that feat again, with the Kang Kon expected to be commissioned in 2026 or early 2027. North Korea has now produced roughly 5,000-ton destroyers faster than it used to produce 2,000-ton corvettes, with two more destroyers of the same size currently under construction. Furthermore, the destroyers have modern combat capabilities in their VLS cells that make them a serious conventional and nuclear threat to U.S., South Korean, and Japanese forces. 

A Timely Response

The KPAN’s increasing combat capabilities will potentially complicate U.S., South Korean, and Japanese defense planning related to sea control and nuclear deterrence, at a minimum. These challenges will only grow if the KPAN is able to overcome the remaining hurdles of integrating modern technology into command-and-control suites, enhancing the training of sailors, further expanding shipbuilding capacity, and adopting modern naval combat tactics.

Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo should recognize the growing threat and deepen trilateral cooperation to counter it. Those efforts should involve regular trilateral military exercises that include not just naval and air assets but also ground forces and integrated command structures. Washington should also maintain a robust U.S. military force posture in South Korea, signaling its political will and military capability to punish and defeat aggression. 

At the political level, President Donald Trump should convene without delay a summit with his Japanese and South Korean counterparts to highlight and strengthen efforts to deepen trilateral security cooperation, building on the successful 2023 summit. This effort should also produce a new trilateral strategy to deter North Korean aggression and counter the dangerous partnership between Pyongyang and Moscow. 

Additionally, the U.S. Congress should require the Department of Defense to publish a previously congressionally mandated report – a requirement that expired in 2017 – on North Korean military capabilities that includes the regime’s growing security cooperation with Russia and China. Congress should also require reports on whether U.S. military capabilities and war plans on the peninsula account for growing North Korean capabilities and impose additional sanctions on Russia over its security cooperation with North Korea. 

Washington should act quickly before additional nuclear-armed North Korean ships prowl the waters of Northeast Asia.