In early June, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev signed enabling laws, putting into effect the new constitution passed via referendum in March 2026. Among the most significant changes was the abolishment of the bicameral parliament and its replacement with a new unicameral body, the Kurultai, whose 145 deputies were subsequently elected through party lists on August 23.

While the domestic consequences of the changes to the legislature have been debated widely, the question of how they will affect Kazakhstan’s foreign policymaking remains underexamined.     

With the abolishment of the bicameral parliament – comprising an upper house, the Senate, and a lower house, the Mazhilis – the number of committees under the new legislature was reduced to eight, down from 13 (seven in the former Mazhilis and six in the Senate).

Under Article 61 of the prior constitution, the dual-committee structure provided checks and balances within the legislative branch. The Mazhilis’s Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Security served as the primary chamber for drafting, amending, and holding preliminary readings for security and international agreements, while the Senate’s Committee on International Relations, Defense, and Security acted as a second layer of technical and diplomatic vetting. Treaties and defense pacts moved sequentially through both chambers and both committees. The Senate could approve, return for revisions, or reject a bill passed by the Mazhilis.

Another structural change lies in how deputies are selected. In the previous bicameral parliament, the president could appoint a certain number of deputies, and often appointed seasoned diplomats such as former ambassadors, ex-ministers, and career officials. The most prominent example is the current president, Tokayev, who was twice appointed as Senate speaker. Under the previous constitution, the Senate speaker was designated to become acting president if a sitting president stepped down or could not perform their duties – that’s what happened in 2019 when Nursultan Nazarbayev resigned. When Nazarbayev resigned, that arrangement delivered the presidency to an experienced diplomat, an outcome read at the time as a signal that Nazarbayev considered foreign policy the greatest challenge of the transition.

Although the previous Senate could reject the Mazhilis’ bills, it rarely rejected one outright. A strong presidency in Kazakhstan mostly sets direction of foreign policy, and the upper and lower chambers were typically aligned with the president’s objectives and policies. There was a case in 2011 when the Senate rejected a Mazhilis bill on the planned deployment of military personnel to Afghanistan. Most of the time, however, the two chambers did not come into conflict, and international agreements and treaties passed smoothly.

Under the new Kurultai, all foreign policy affairs fall to the Committee on International Relations, now chaired by Marat Kozhayev. The committee will be responsible for legislative review and preliminary scrutiny of international treaties, security pacts, and bilateral agreements. Given how much further the presidency has been consolidated under the new constitution, the Kurultai’s foreign policy outlook is likely to align closely with Tokayev’s. And with all deputies now elected through party lists, the Kurultai may lack experience in international law and negotiation that the previous Senate held via presidential appointments, as mentioned above.

Tokayev has framed these constitutional and structural reforms as a modernization, an answer to the turbulence in world politics. The changes are supposed to push the agenda of creating an “effective, transparent and responsive” system. Ambitious as it is, this path poses several risks to foreign policy. First, with no second layer of review, the risk of ratifying rushed or flawed agreements increases.

Second, the new system further consolidates executive power. The president holds the right to dissolve the Kurultai if it repeatedly rejects the presidentially nominated parliamentary chairman, further weakening the legislature. Moreover, according to Article 42 of the new constitution, the president, as the head of state, holds the authority to determine the primary directions of foreign policy, as well as negotiate and sign treaties. A newly created advisory institution, the People’s Council (Halyk Kenesi), will also “possess the right of legislative initiative and will be empowered to introduce bills to parliament,” as well as “the power to prepare legislation for the Kurultai and, on the same basis as parliament, to propose nationwide referendums.” Notably, the People’s Council consists of 126 members drawn from three categories – ethnocultural organizations, local governments (Maslikhats), and civil society – but all approved by the president. 

To minimize the risks to Kazakhstan’s foreign policy now that the Senate, its chamber of sober second thought, has been abolished, the country should consider introducing minimum review windows to avoid rushed decisions, empowering the Kurultai’s Committee on International Relations, and ensuring that the newly created People’s Council remains strictly an advisory, consultative forum.