With his surprise decision to scale back the recent Ulchi Freedom Shield military exercise on the Korean Peninsula, U.S. President Donald Trump clearly signaled his intent to rekindle dialogue with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. However, rather than receiving praise for the goodwill measure, the effort drew rebuke from the North Korean government, which reiterated its position that it has no interest in renewing engagement as long as the United States holds onto denuclearization as a policy objective.

This exchange has renewed debates over long-standing denuclearization policies, particularly as Trump continues his overtures toward the Kim regime in hopes of a possible meeting on the sidelines of the APEC summit in November. Some have argued it is time to abandon denuclearization as a policy goal and shift to arms control, while others contend that such a concession would undermine the global nonproliferation regime and place further stress on allied relationships.

Rather than a binary “should they, shouldn’t they” approach, the issue requires a more nuanced examination of the constraints and interests at play. For example, what does the Kim regime mean when it demands that foreign governments drop denuclearization as a precondition for talks? What does the Trump administration hope to achieve by renewing engagement? Further, would dropping denuclearization even be politically sustainable for this administration or other governments?

It’s useful to break down the denuclearization debate, examining the knowns and unknowns for the two sides.

Trump’s Overtures and North Korea’s Response

On August 16, Trump announced the shortening of the annual South Korea-U.S. Ulchi Freedom Shield joint military exercise, reiterating his usual claim that the exercises are costly and adding that they “send a signal that is totally inappropriate and hostile” to North Korea. He claimed that the Kim regime has been “unthreatening and respectful” during his presidency. 

North Korea’s response came on August 19 in the form of a statement attributed to Kim Yo Jong, Kim Jong Un’s high-ranking sister. The statement declared that Pyongyang regarded the reduction of exercises as “unworthy of comment” and has “no interest in it at all” due to “the nature of the military drill with a provocative and offensive feature.” North Korea followed that up two weeks later with another statement attributed to an unnamed Foreign Ministry spokesperson, noting “it is pointless to expect any détente in the region” as the “U.S. remains committed to the complete denuclearization of the DPRK” (an abbreviation of North Korea’s formal name, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea). 

But this may be changing. In other contexts, the White House has demonstrated a willingness to abandon status quo policies and pursue rapprochement with authoritarian governments. As a result, the administration may consider shifting from denuclearization-first diplomacy to an approach that de-emphasizes denuclearization through arms control and risk reduction measures, or even eliminates it as a policy objective altogether. 

The Knowns and Unknowns of North Korean Demands

The Kim regime has clearly set a precondition for renewed engagement with the United States: drop denuclearization from the agenda. What is less clear is what North Korea actually expects with this precondition.  

Pyongyang’s rejections of denuclearization evolved following the brief period of diplomacy in 2018-19.  After the failure of Kim Jong Un and Trump to reach an agreement at the February 2019 Hanoi Summit, Pyongyang hardened its stance against denuclearization. In December 2019, North Korean Ambassador to the United Nations Kim Song stated that “denuclearization is already gone out of the negotiation table.” Based on numerous statements since, North Korea’s position has become more absolute: denuclearization is not up for negotiation and Pyongyang has no intention to relinquish its nuclear arms. 

Despite the hardline position, the Kim regime has not shut the door completely on potential engagement. North Korea has continued to highlight the “excellent” relationship between Kim Jong Un and Trump, referencing Kim’s “good memories and feelings” towards the U.S. president. Although positive inclinations in a personal relationship do not necessarily translate to rapprochement between governments, these are notable signals that may compel Washington to pursue status quo-changing pathways to engagement. 

A challenge for Washington is that the scope of the required policy change is not yet clear. What specific actions would Pyongyang expect from Washington to signal the end of denuclearization? Does this mean a policy pronouncement, rescission of United Nations Security Council resolutions, or something else? 

It is also unclear whether the Kim regime would be willing to offer concessions in return. There is no indication thus far of what may be negotiable with denuclearization off the agenda, whether it be arms control or other tradeoffs such as reducing North Korea’s military aid to Russia. This creates a risk: if the United States does give ground on denuclearization, Pyongyang could simply walk away from dialogue since it has already met one of its key policy objectives.

The U.S. Debate Over Denuclearization

On the U.S. side, there is a growing recognition that North Korea’s nuclear capability is now an established reality. Three decades of efforts to persuade Pyongyang to relinquish its nuclear weapons have not curbed the Kim regime’s ability to develop a nuclear weapons program of considerable scale and capability. Trump recently said North Korea has 57 warheads, while the South Korean Ministry of National Defense estimated it to be somewhere between 80 and 120.

From the outset, the United States’ goal has been to achieve a nuclear-free peninsula through diplomatic means. This has contributed to a substantial body of policies, sanctions, and international resolutions aimed at constraining and ultimately eliminating the North Korea nuclear program. Thus, there are significant legal and political considerations that affect the extent to which Washington can pursue alternate approaches. 

One consideration is the global nonproliferation regime. A shift in U.S. policy would have ripple effects across the framework designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, including the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Experts have pointed out that abandoning denuclearization would signal a de facto acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear-armed state, and that risks not only undermining the Non-Proliferation Treaty but setting a precedent for other rogue states to pursue nuclear armament.

Also, the United States and the U.N. Security Council have imposed numerous rounds of sanctions on North Korea in response to its nuclear development and testing activities, in part to mitigate the increase in nuclear weapons while also deterring others from pursuing similar programs. A formal policy shift that accepted North Korea as a nuclear-armed state would raise questions about the status of existing sanctions and internationally agreed-upon resolutions. At the U.N. level, alterations to the North Korea sanctions program would require Security Council action, potentially requiring the modification or termination of existing resolutions that could easily be blocked by a veto from France, the United Kingdom, or any of the other five permanent members of the Security Council. 

A second consideration is the response from U.S. allies. Most American allies and partners have established policies supporting a nuclear-free North Korea, so any unilateral U.S. decision will have cascading effects, forcing other governments either to adapt to a policy shift or oppose the U.S. approach. This will be particularly important for South Korea and Japan. 

Although Seoul has already placed denuclearization as the last step of its “END” strategy (“Exchange, Normalization, Denuclearization”) it has not dropped it as a goal altogether. Meanwhile, Japan’s commitment to North Korea’s complete denuclearization remains a pillar of its security designs. A change would push Tokyo to assess how much policy space exists within its current framework to move closer to Washington’s or Seoul’s approach. It may be possible for the three to retain a formal commitment to denuclearization while also pursuing nuclear risk reduction and arms controls, but there will invariably be an impact to trilateral cooperation that requires close coordination. 

Further, any pursuit of diplomatic engagement with North Korea without addressing the Kim regime’s ongoing support for Russia’s war effort against Ukraine will invariably face opposition from the United States’ European allies. These partners may withhold support outright unless the White House is willing to leverage issues related to the Russia-Ukraine War in pursuit of engagement with Pyongyang.

The third factor is domestic politics. While the Trump administration was able to move forward on controversial decisions in the first half of his term, the forthcoming midterm election could bring to power a Democratic-controlled Congress, which would attempt more restraint. Additionally, groups across the political spectrum are opposed to altering denuclearization policy, calling into question the sustainability of such a change. Notably, Trump cannot run for re-election; the coming change in presidential administration after 2028 could result in an outright policy reversal.

What This Tells Us About the Denuclearization Debate

These knowns and unknowns reveal a few key considerations for the denuclearization debate.

To start, it would be useful to canvas North Korea about what it actually means by dropping denuclearization as a policy objective. In other words, if the White House is seeking meaningful engagement, a starting point can be inquiring about the Kim regime’s expectations for moving forward past denuclearization. This can be communicated through direct lines of communication or signaled through talking points in the media. 

It is also essential to identify the two sides’ goals if preconditions are met and talks happen. Right now, there is no clear indication of what the White House would be seeking to achieve through another summit between Trump and Kim Jong Un. Conversely, after more than 30 years of focusing on denuclearization, it is unclear what the Kim regime would be prepared to discuss in direct dialogue with the United States. Focused examinations and debates on these issues would be helpful in charting a course forward for any potential engagement.

Finally, it is necessary to determine how to translate goals into sustainable policy adjustments. The reality is that the U.S. and North Korea governments are different in nature, and while the Kim regime may be willing and able to institutionalize a permanent change to the status quo, conditions for a democratically-elected government are different. Unilaterally dropping denuclearization as a U.S. policy objective for a photo op will almost inevitably result in significant political pushback and challenges, both domestically and abroad. 

Ultimately, the denuclearization debate must be resolved if dialogue with North Korea remains an objective. However, if the goal is to ensure that the dialogue actually produces meaningful outcomes, the debate will require more nuance and structure than currently exist. What would this policy shift mean in practice? Can the White House build an engagement strategy that is realistic enough to produce useful dialogue with North Korea, ambitious enough to reduce nuclear risks, and durable enough to overcome the inevitable obstacles along the way? 

A clear understanding of both parties’ expectations and goals will be essential for coordinating with allies and multilateral agencies and institutionalizing any agreements to safeguard against collapse.