On June 2, India firmly rejected Nepali Prime Minister Balendra Shah’s call for the United Kingdom to mediate the India-Nepal border dispute.

“It should be clear to all concerned that there is no role for any third parties in a bilateral matter between India and Nepal,” Randhir Jaiswal, spokesperson of India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), said at a weekly media briefing in New Delhi. India and Nepal have bilateral mechanisms to deal with border issues, he said.

The MEA statement came two days after Shah told Nepal’s parliament that his government had “spoken not only with India and China but also with the U.K. government” regarding the territorial dispute. “Our view is that the U.K. should also take an interest, as the issue dates back to the period when British India left the region,” the Kathmandu Post quoted Shah as saying.

India and Nepal share a 1,880 km-long open border. As Jaiswal noted at the briefing, “close to 98 percent of the India-Nepal boundary has been demarcated.” The changing course of rivers has resulted in some “unresolved segments” along the border, he said, adding that “there are cases of cross-border occupation and encroachment of no-man’s land in demarcated segments of the boundary which are currently being mapped jointly.”

The Lipulekh-Kalapani-Limpiyadhura area is among the areas that remain disputed.

The roots of the dispute can be traced back to the Sugauli Treaty of 1816, signed between Nepal and British India. While declaring the Mahakali River as the border between the two countries, the treaty did not define where the river originates. No map was attached to the treaty either. India cites revenue records dating back to the 1830s to justify its claims over the territory.

The Lipulekh-Kalapani-Limpiyadhura area is highly strategic. It is at the China-India-Nepal-trijunction. India controls the area; since the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, Indian soldiers have been deployed at Kalapani.

The territorial dispute has repeatedly erupted to the fore in recent years. In 2020, when India inaugurated a road through the Lipulekh Pass to Kailash Mansarovar, a major Hindu pilgrimage site in the Tibet Autonomous Region of China, Nepal hit back. It turned to maps to assert and consolidate its claims. The K.P. Sharma Oli government, widely seen to be pro-China, unveiled a political map depicting Kalapani, Lipulekh, and Limpiyadhura as part of Nepali territory.

A furious India described the new Nepali map as a “unilateral act.” The MEA said that the map was “not based on historical facts and evidence. It is contrary to the bilateral understanding to resolve the outstanding boundary issues through diplomatic dialogue. Such artificial enlargement of territorial claims will not be accepted by India.”

Nepal was not intimidated. It dug in its heels thereafter. The new map was endorsed by parliament, a step that Oli described as a “milestone towards reclaiming Nepal’s land,” and was also incorporated in the Nepali constitution via an amendment bill. Currency notes issued since 2025 carry an image of the new map.

Meanwhile, India and China, which are otherwise locked in a competition for influence in Nepal, have joined hands at Lipulekh.

Since 2015, when New Delhi and Beijing agreed to use the Lipulekh Pass for bilateral trade and the Kailash Mansarovar pilgrimage, they have acted bilaterally, without consulting Nepal.

Five years later, India inaugurated the road connecting Dharchula in India’s Uttarakhand state to Lipulekh to ease trade and travel. As part of confidence-building to ease bilateral tensions that had erupted since the 2020 Galwan clashes, during Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to India in August 2025 India and China agreed to reopen the Lipulekh Pass for border trade. On April 30 this year, India announced that Indian pilgrims would travel to Kailash Mansarovar between June and August 2026. One of the routes listed for this pilgrimage is Lipulekh Pass.

The China-India decisions on trade and travel via the Lipulekh Pass have understandably ruffled feathers in Nepal, as it has not been consulted or kept in the loop, a Nepali official based in Delhi, who did not want to be named, told The Diplomat.

So, what underlies Shah’s recent statement calling on the United Kingdom to “take an interest” in the border dispute?

Since becoming prime minister, Shah has adopted an “equal stature” policy in his diplomatic dealings. He has, for example, refused to meet leaders or officials who are not of his rank and is seeking to project Nepal as a sovereign equal in diplomacy.

Bypassed by India and China, Nepal’s two giant neighbors, on the question of trade and travel via the Lipulekh Pass, Shah could be “attempting to inject Nepal back into the dispute as an important stakeholder,” the Nepali official said.

Interestingly, in his speech in parliament, Shah said that both India and Nepal have encroached into each other’s territories. “Now, both countries should study the facts and sit together as friends and resolve the issue,” he said. His remark, which has triggered outrage in Nepal — the Nepali masses have hitherto heard their politicians only accuse India of encroaching into Nepali territory and not vice versa — could be an overture to India, aimed at a dialogue that would pave the way for a settlement based on mutual concessions on where the border runs.

However, it is hard to ignore the timing of Shah’s remarks. It came on the eve of the visit of Rabi Lamichhane, leader of Nepal’s ruling Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP), to India. Shah, a former rapper and mayor of Kathmandu, contested on an RSP ticket in the general election. But since becoming prime minister, he and Lamichhane are reported to have drifted apart.

Was Shah hoping to derail Lamichhane’s India visit with his comments on a role for the U.K., which he would have known would rile India?

If that was his objective, Shah failed. Lamichhane’s visit to Delhi was a success. India rolled out the red carpet for him. The RSP chief got to meet Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Home Minister Amit Shah, and External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar, besides the entire top brass of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party.

In his two months at the helm in Nepal, Shah has displayed not only an authoritarian streak but also immaturity as a leader, one with little understanding of regional diplomacy. Reports also indicate that he appears to be tilting closer to China.

India appears to be building bridges with Nepal by courting Lamichhane. That could, in turn, prompt Shah into a deeper embrace of China. Beijing will be preparing for Shah’s likely outreach.