India faces one of the most challenging security environments in the world, confronting not one but two adversarial neighbors: Pakistan and China. While New Delhi retains the conventional military upper hand over Islamabad, in Beijing it confronts a militarily and economically superior power that has repeatedly used force to alter the status quo along their disputed border.

Since the 1962 border war, India and China have faced a series of military confrontations, including the 2017 Doklam standoff and the deadly Galwan Valley clashes in 2020. More recently, Beijing reportedly provided Islamabad with critical intelligence support during the 2025 India-Pakistan conflict, raising the likelihood that any future Indo-Pak crisis will unfold against the backdrop of Chinese support for Islamabad.

Given this geopolitical reality, India must prepare to deter and, if needed, confront future Chinese aggression. Although formidable, India’s military remains conventionally weaker than China’s. At $92 billion, New Delhi’s defense spending is just over a quarter of Beijing’s. Despite India’s efforts to procure advanced Western fighter jets and develop its own indigenous capabilities, China still enjoys a 3:1 advantage in airpower, and its naval modernization far outpaces India’s own efforts.

Fortunately for India, it does not need to match China’s military capabilities one-to-one to establish credible deterrence. The ongoing conflict in the Gulf presents yet another lesson in how it can use asymmetric warfare to its advantage. Over the past six months, Iran has demonstrated its ability to threaten commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, disrupting global energy markets and imposing disproportionate costs on conventionally superior military powers.

China, too, has a major maritime vulnerability. Nearly 80 percent of its total energy imports, worth $312 billion, pass through the Strait of Malacca – the shortest sea route between the Middle East and East Asia – creating a critical maritime chokepoint. Recognizing this, China has invested heavily in mitigating the so-called “Malacca Dilemma,” but despite these efforts Beijing remains deeply exposed. Alternative waterways like Sunda and Lombok increase travel time, fuel costs, and logistical complexity, while land-based routes linked to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) are expensive and vulnerable to political instability. It is still critical for China that this vital sea lane remains open.

If it invests in the right maritime denial capabilities, New Delhi could exploit Beijing’s dependence on the Strait of Malacca to offset its conventional disadvantage, whether in a major conflict involving Chinese military aggression against India, or in a situation with more direct military involvement from Beijing in an Indo-Pak crisis. If it finds itself pulled into a broader Indo-Pacific contingency, New Delhi could even work in coordination with Western naval forces. 

Disrupting traffic through the Malacca Strait would carry considerable military and political risks. However, India need not close the strait to strengthen deterrence. The ability to credibly threaten such disruption could force Beijing to account for severe economic costs, underscoring the need for India to invest in maritime-denial capabilities now. To address regional concerns, India would need to frame these capabilities as part of a broader effort to strengthen deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, ideally in coordination with regional partners rather than over their heads.

Such a strategy would hinge on a layered maritime-denial architecture. India’s control of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands means it does not need to rely on expensive aircraft carriers to threaten shipping through the Malacca Strait. Instead, it could use low-cost unmanned systems of the kind Iran has employed to deter Chinese vessels and alter the cost-benefit calculus for China. 

Similarly, India could utilize inexpensive naval mines to complicate maritime access; the psychological impact of a mined waterway alone can be sufficient to deter vessels carrying expensive cargoes. 

The Indian Navy’s submarines operating from the Bay of Bengal would be another valuable asset in such a scenario, not simply because they would put vessels at risk, but also because their presence would force Beijing to devote scarce resources to complex anti-submarine warfare operations.

New Delhi’s growing anti-ship cruise missile arsenal would add to the efficacy of such a layered area-denial architecture. India’s BrahMos and new long-range hypersonic anti-ship missile could threaten Chinese ships from the Andaman and Nicobar Islands without putting expensive naval destroyers in harm’s way.  

To make the strategy credible, however, India would need more than just these individual assets. It would need persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance across the eastern Indian Ocean; resilient command-and-control networks; and regular military exercises that demonstrate an ability to integrate drones, submarines, mines, and missiles into a coherent maritime denial strategy. 

While New Delhi has invested in expanding its arsenal of these individual assets, it still lacks a coherent maritime denial strategy for the Strait of Malacca. Such an objective would be better served, for one, by fortifying the Andaman and Nicobar Command with credible military capabilities – an undertaking that should not be conflated with the Great Nicobar Island Project. The project has evident dual-use dimensions, but it remains primarily a commercial infrastructure initiative and should not be treated as a substitute for hard military power.

China has spent decades trying to resolve the Malacca Dilemma because Beijing understands its vulnerability. India should recognize that same reality. It need not match China ship for ship or aircraft for aircraft. By investing in credible maritime denial capabilities around the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, New Delhi can ensure that any Chinese aggression carries costs Beijing cannot ignore.