Over the past decade, U.S. policy toward China transformed from one focused on economic engagement to that of competition and decoupling. These changes occurred amid broader concerns about China’s economic practices and ambitions. How the American public perceives China’s economic actions remains less clearly understood.

Existing survey research suggests that the American public is wary of China’s economic rise and the fairness of bilateral trade, while often acknowledging the importance of trade relations and remaining skeptical of tariffs. A 2024 Cato Institute survey showed 59 percent of respondents viewed China’s trade practices with the U.S. as unfair, while a 2025 Pew Research survey found that 46 percent of respondents believed China benefited more than the U.S. in U.S.-China trade, with only 10 percent believing the U.S. benefited more. Likewise, a 2024 Gallup poll found 63 percent viewed China’s economic power as a critical threat, although a later 2025 Chicago Council Survey found Americans nearly evenly split on whether trade weakened or strengthened U.S. national security. 

These tensions raise a fundamental question for policymakers: Does public opinion support a sustained shift toward economic separation, or does it reflect a more ambivalent set of preferences? Public opinion may be shaped by competing economic self-interest versus national security frames, which do not always produce consistent policy preferences. 

My survey results suggest clear concerns, but not necessarily a mandate for either engagement or wholesale decoupling. This is consistent with broader work that finds Americans acknowledge the benefits of trade while being concerned about unfairness and vulnerabilities. Such a lack of clarity may complicate efforts at a long-term economic strategy that effectively addresses China’s economic capabilities.

To address views on economic relations with China, I asked several economic-related questions as part of a national web survey. The survey used quota sampling based on age, gender, and region, was administered by Centiment from February 23 to March 3, and included 810 respondents.

First, respondents evaluated, on a five-point scale (very negative to very positive), their views of several countries, including China. Here, respondents gave China on average a score of 2.82, with marginal differences between Democrats (2.92) and Republicans (2.79). Respondents also rated, on a 10-point scale, how important they believed trade and economic relations between the U.S. and China were to the general U.S. economy. Overall, respondents gave relations a score of 7.27, with Democrats placing slightly greater importance on trade (7.48) than Republicans (7.27). The similarity in overall perceptions of China and in the importance of economic relations is notable amid partisan polarization, suggesting a baseline recognition of economic interdependence. Admittedly, respondents were not asked explicitly whether they would prefer the U.S. to limit trade overall. Absent such a question, these findings likely capture attitudes toward trade conditions rather than support for decoupling more broadly.

Next, respondents were asked who they believed benefited more from trade between the two countries, and whether current trade relations were fair. Here we find a divided public, with the largest group (37.8 percent) believing the benefits are about equal. However, Democrats were considerably more likely than Republicans to see the benefits as equal (44.4 percent vs, 28.5 percent), while Republicans were more likely to believe China benefits more (40.3 percent vs. 28.7 percent). Initial evaluations of China also correspond with beliefs of who benefits, with 47 percent of those with a negative view of China believing they benefit more from trade, dropping to 29 percent among those with a positive view of the country. Separating respondents based on whether they rated economic relations above the average (8 or higher) or below the average (6 or lower) shows clear differences as well. The former were more likely to believe the U.S. benefited more (33.5 percent vs. 21.2 percent) and conversely less likely to think China benefited more (29.8 percent vs. 39.6 percent). 

Concerns about fairness may reflect anxieties about domestic economic outcomes, especially in manufacturing, where American producers are particularly vulnerable. Here again, we find a divided public: 34.2 percent say trade was unfair, while 27.7 percent see it as fair. Again, a partisan divergence emerges, with Republicans more likely to claim trade is unfair (39.1 percent vs 29.0 percent), though both Democrats and Republicans show similar divisions in perceptions of fairness within their subgroups. Again, those already with a negative view of China were far more likely to view trade as unfair (54.6 percent) compared to those with a positive view (17.1 percent). Likewise, those who viewed economic relations as more important were far more likely to see trade as fair (41.1 percent) than those who viewed economic relations as less important (13 percent). Taking benefits and fairness together, the results suggest a level of uncertainty and perhaps skepticism about the gains from trade, but do not necessarily imply a rejection of trade outright, rather of the current terms of trade.

Respondents were also asked if they support or oppose restricting Chinese companies from doing business in the U.S. Overall, support outpaced opposition by nearly fifteen points (39.6 percent vs. 24.7 percent). The most pronounced split is partisan: 32.1 percent of Democrats support restrictions compared to 55.5 percent of Republicans. Notably, 54.4 percent of those with a positive view of China support restrictions, versus 42.9 percent among those with a negative view. Similarly, 47.4 percent of those prioritizing economic relations support restrictions (compared to 28.1 percent who do not). These findings indicate that even those valuing economic ties may support restrictions if they are seen as safeguarding against trade vulnerabilities.

These findings complicate framing U.S.-China economic policy as a binary choice between engagement and decoupling, since public opinion does not neatly map onto either position. The results instead suggest the public may at times hold contradictory views: recognizing the importance of trade but worrying about risks, consistent with a public that implicitly distinguishes between China as an authoritarian regime and as an economic entity. This ambivalence has clear policy implications. A national security framework justifying economic restrictions may not address the underlying concerns of fairness and the distribution of trade benefits. More broadly, the results indicate the public may prefer selective decoupling when trade seems particularly unfair, while maintaining or even expanding economic ties elsewhere.