In February 2026, camps and prisons that previously hosted thousands of foreign fighters and families affiliated with the Islamic State (IS) were emptied, as control over northeast Syria shifted from the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces to the new Syrian government. The transition has been chaotic. On January 21, the U.S. began assisting the transfer of over 5,700 IS-affiliated fighters, mostly men and older boys, to prisons in Iraq. Shortly after this, the Al-Hol camp in northeastern Syria, which as of January was still housing around 23,400 women and children, including 6,200 IS-affiliated foreigners, was closed down in a matter of days.

Hundreds of IS detainees escaped Al-Hol camp in the past weeks, taking advantage of security lapses during the power transition. While some detainees were officially transferred to the new Akhtarin camp in northern Aleppo, the majority have reportedly left the camp independently and their whereabouts are unknown. In the coming weeks, the second biggest camp holding IS detainees, Al-Roj, is also slated to be closed down. Many of the 2,400 IS-affiliated third country nationals there will likely also attempt escapes. Some of these escapes may be facilitated by IS. In late January, IS published an editorial in Al Naba which called on its supporters to smuggle Muslim women out from the camps.

Among the foreigners fleeing the IS-affiliated camps are Southeast Asians. Indonesia, which had the largest number of fighters traveling to join IS among Southeast Asian countries, has so far verified that 182 of its citizens departed the camps. There are reports that a hundred more have fled. Malaysia, which reported 56 IS-affiliated citizens in Syria in 2022, has not provided updates on the status of Malaysian detainees. Similarly, there have been no statements from the Philippines or Vietnam. A U.N. Commission in 2024 noted that both countries have citizens held in the Syrian camps.

The future of the escaped IS-linked detainees is unclear. While arguably all detainees desired to leave the Al-Hol and Al-Roj camps, the population can roughly be divided into those who still believe in the IS caliphate project and those who are disillusioned. Child detainees would likely have no say in their future, regardless of their belief in the IS ideology, and be attached to where their parents choose to go. Without proper repatriation mechanisms from their home governments, even those who are disillusioned and no longer sympathize with IS may be stuck in Syria, where they would be vulnerable to being recruited as IS fighters. 

Yet, some IS-affiliated detainees may attempt to return home, even with no official repatriation policies. In February, 34 Australian citizens attempted to escape Al-Roj camp, following the earlier successful return of six Australians in September-October 2025. A Belgian national also successfully returned to Belgium recently, where she was arrested upon arrival. Between December 2023-December 2024, Indonesia received 41 IS-affiliated returnees, most of whom had escaped from Syrian camps. 

Countries must thus be prepared to handle this evolving security situation, including receiving returnees in the event they successfully return. Three key issues need to be addressed. First is the identification and prosecution of former IS fighters. 

Most of the active IS fighters imprisoned in Syria were transferred to different prisons in Iraq. While Iraq has had experience with prosecuting transferred detainees from Syria, some scholars have argued that the Iraqi legal system has no jurisdiction to prosecute foreign terrorist fighters who are neither from Iraq nor had committed terrorist activity in Iraq. There is also the issue of overcrowded prisons. Just last year, Iraq released 19,381 prisoners due to overcrowding, which allowed members of armed groups to seek release, retrial, or case dismissal. The circumstances with IS fighters may differ as the U.S. has agreed to bear the costs of detention and prosecution of the transferred detainees, but the current situation is nonetheless a cause for concern.  

Indonesia’s experience with returnees demonstrates how easy it is to evade prosecution when no legal basis exists. Many Indonesians who returned from Syria prior to 2018, when Indonesian laws on foreign terrorist fighting came into force, did not immediately face criminal prosecution, with some only arrested six years after they returned. 

In the meantime, they were free individuals. Furthermore, they did not receive adequate deradicalization, rehabilitation, or monitoring, leading to cases of recidivism. For example, Syawaludin Pakpahan, an Indonesian citizen who fought with the Free Syrian Army in 2013 and later pledged allegiance to IS, attacked the North Sumatra regional police command in 2017. Some Malaysian IS supporters who were in Syria reportedly continued to participate in foreign fighting by traveling to Afghanistan. Another Indonesian couple who had attempted to join IS in Syria in 2017 were placed in a rehabilitation center for just one month. They went on to conduct a suicide bombing in Jolo, the Philippines in 2019. 

A second key issue is the rehabilitation and reintegration process. Indonesia has made significant headway in improving its rehabilitation infrastructure, by establishing standard operational procedures for child returnees, training personnel to handle radicalized returnees, and coordinating with local governments for reintegration and other preventing and countering violent extremism (PCVE) measures. 

However, the implementation and coordination of programs could be further improved. These programs have been sporadic in the past, with some returnees and/or deportees only receiving two weeks to one month of deradicalization measures. The Indonesian government has reportedly worked on extending deradicalization programs to six months to one year, but to date no minimum period of deradicalization and rehabilitation has been set. In Malaysia’s case, the rehabilitation and reintegration program is a month-long, which is likely also too short for cases of returnees who have spent the past decade in an IS-dominated environment.

Furthermore, intersectoral coordination needs to be improved, particularly in assigning which agency will be responsible for the deradicalization, rehabilitation, reintegration and monitoring of returnees. Reportedly, deradicalization under Indonesia’s proposed repatriation policy is under the purview of the National Counter Terrorism Agency, while the Ministry of Social Affairs handles the rehabilitation and counseling of terrorism-linked returnees. However, monitoring of former terrorist offenders is typically conducted by police counterterrorism unit Densus 88.

Recent policy shifts in Indonesia which seek to introduce a stronger role of the military in counter terrorism, including in deradicalization and rehabilitation processes, may further lead to confusion about who is responsible for returnees. This needs to be clearly coordinated before returnees arrive. Otherwise, buck-passing may happen with no agency taking the lead for handling returnees, and individuals being able to slip through the cracks.

Finally, it is important to prevent IS from exploiting the momentum of detainees escaping to regroup and recruit. In the past few weeks, IS has launched small-scale attacks against Syrian government military bases, justifying such attacks by depicting the Al-Sharaa regime as a watchdog of the “Turkish-American occupation.”

This narrative has been repeated by Indonesian IS supporters on mainstream social media platforms like Facebook, potentially reigniting motivations for violent jihad. Some IS supporters in Indonesia portrayed the February 24 IS attacks in Albu Kamal, Deir Ez-Zor province, as proof that IS sleeper cells have been activated in these areas. As the US withdraws troops from Syria and shifts to a strategy of airstrikes against IS targets, the reduction of on-the-ground forces may create opportunities for IS supporters to regroup, recruit, and mobilize.

In conclusion, the developing situation in Syria is cause for concern as transitions in the governance of IS-linked camps have created authority vacuums which allowed for the escape of hundreds of IS-affiliated individuals. Some of these individuals may seek to return to their home country, while others may resettle elsewhere in Syria or move on to other conflict theaters. These developments could be exploited by IS, which is currently strategizing to regroup and wage war against the new Syrian government. 

Southeast Asia, while being far from Syria, is nonetheless linked to these developments due to the presence of its nationals as IS supporters in Syria and the potential return of some of these supporters to the region. Rather than waiting and hoping that the risks from prolonged detainment of IS supporters in a volatile security environment do not materialize, governments would be better off implementing a proper repatriation regime where they can identify, prosecute, rehabilitate, and monitor former IS supporters.