In March, a U.S. ally declared a “state of energy emergency” after experiencing disruptions to its crude deliveries. After gaining a waiver from Washington, Petron, the Philippines’ only refinery, bought Russian oil. The episode exposed a decades-old vulnerability in U.S. strategy: Philippine fuel insecurity.

Beginning in 2010, across three Pacific tours, I’ve watched China erode regional security through its increased power and aggression. For the United States to deter China from a Taiwan annexation attempt, it requires access to the Philippines and its oil. However, a conflict that draws in the U.S. will likely disrupt the Philippine oil imports that sustain American operations.

The Philippines sits at the Pacific’s crossroads, in the middle of the First Island Chain, connecting Taiwan and the South China Sea. The Philippines’ placement makes it vital to U.S. deterrence. Economically, this region carries 43 percent of global crude shipments and 21 percent of trade. Geographically, control of the Luzon Strait would allow China to isolate Taiwan.

For 20 years, Chinese coercion has revealed Beijing’s desire to control these crossroads, annex Taiwan, and dominate the Pacific. To deter China and sustain American operations 6,500 miles from California, the U.S. needs reliable access to the Philippines and its oil. Yet Manila’s small, nearly import-only oil industry leaves it and U.S. forces vulnerable.

During my last tour in the Pacific, then-Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan. China’s response, and its subsequent isolation “rehearsals,” demonstrated its power and aggression. Several isolation zones extended across the Luzon Strait, and, based on recent events, Beijing intends to contest Philippine sovereignty in these areas.

Luzon is critical to deterring “a conflict over Taiwan” and safeguarding global shipping routes, because it’s within ground-based missile range of Taiwan. For China to annex Taiwan, it must control the Luzon Strait to blockade Taiwan, threaten Philippine sovereignty, and degrade U.S. intervention. However, if the United States can maintain reliable access, it can resupply Taiwan and deny a Chinese annexation operation.

But geography is only one part of the equation. Operations from Luzon depend on reliable Philippine oil. American fuel dependence turns Manila’s energy fragility into a strategic vulnerability.

In 2022, the U.S. Department of Defense required over 73 million barrels for operations, training, and exercises globally, with 48 percent purchased overseas. Unsurprisingly, air and maritime operations account for 91 percent of demand, roughly 66.5 million barrels. Any Sino-American conflict would place enormous pressure on fuel supplies thousands of miles from the U.S. homeland.

The Philippines alone consumes 474,000 barrels per day and maintains only a 40-45 day reserve. Since Caltex and Shell closed their refineries, Petron has capacity to support only a limited share of national demand. Manila relies on imports, with almost 97 percent of crude coming from the Middle East and nearly 95 percent of refined products coming from Asia.

In a crisis, U.S. demands on Philippine oil would rapidly deplete Manila’s reserves. At the same time, Chinese maritime interdiction operations in the South China Sea would disrupt Philippine import routes and constrain American operations. The result would be another “state of energy emergency.”

Proven Philippine oil reserves stand at 139 million barrels, with another 202 million more locked in Bangsamoro’s Liguasan Marsh, which is a historical insurgency hotspot. Developing these resources and expanding refining capacity strengthens Manila’s resiliency. It’s also a mutually beneficial opportunity for Philippine-U.S. commercial cooperation.

Currently, the Pentagon is building extra oil capacity in Davao to “enable U.S. naval vessels to receive fuel.” The new depot is a positive step forward, but its limited capacity and continuous resupply needs mean that storage alone cannot solve the underlying problem.

American security requires more than stockpiles; it requires stronger Philippine extraction and refining capacity. The U.S.-Venezuela framework offers one possible model. This year, several U.S.-based oil companies signed agreements to develop Venezuelan reserves in support of both countries’ interests. The Philippine context differs, but the underlying mechanism, a bilateral agreement to unlock private-sector investment in domestic production, could be adapted to Washington’s and Manila’s needs.

Many existing Philippine-U.S. energy programs cover renewables, nuclear power, energy costs, and critical minerals, but none specifically targets Manila’s weak fuel extraction, refining, and distribution system. The November ASEAN Summit in Manila, where U.S. President Donald Trump and Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. may meet, offers an opportunity.

Washington should create a targeted Philippine oil resilience program directly linked to U.S. strategy. An ideal model to emulate is the Philippines Energy Threshold Program. Both nations’ commercial investment sectors can strengthen Manila’s fuel security and expand its capacity. To be sure, one program cannot address every wartime need, but it will reduce U.S. vulnerabilities.

My proposal benefits both nations’ prosperity, commercial industries, and U.S. strategy. From my tours, I’ve seen how oil underpins strategy. In a Sino-American conflict, we cannot assume fuel will arrive. Both nations should create an oil resilience program now, before the crisis begins.