The Israeli-U.S. military operation against Iran that began on February 28 has already sent economic shockwaves well beyond the Middle East. For the landlocked economies of Central Asia, the fallout is immediate and tangible: trade routes severed, food supplies disrupted, and energy prices spiking. The region, which had been quietly deepening economic ties with Tehran for years, now faces the consequences of that proximity.

Iran banned all food and agricultural exports on March 3, citing the need to prevent domestic shortages. The decision took effect immediately. For Tajikistan, the impact is direct. Trade between the two countries quadrupled over the past five years, reaching a record $484 million in 2025. Iranian dairy, sugar, spices, fruits, and vegetables are staples in Tajik markets. In 2025 alone, Tajikistan imported over 2,600 tons of oranges, about 1,000 tons of watermelons, and more than 3,300 tons of white sugar from Iran. Those supplies have now stopped arriving. Somon Air, Tajikistan’s national carrier, suspended flights on the Dushanbe-Tehran route until the end of March.

Turkmenistan, which shares a border with Iran, is the most exposed. Residents in Turkmenistan’s western Balkan region rely heavily on Iranian imports for food and household items. Prices for cooking oil, chicken, and potatoes have nearly doubled since the war began. The Sarakhs border crossing, a key hub for Iranian goods entering Turkmenistan, has largely ground to a halt. Satellite imagery from late February showed long lines of trucks at the Turkmen customs checkpoint, and subsequent images indicated no movement at all.

Uzbekistan, too, is feeling the pressure. An Uzbek distributor of Iranian dairy products in Samarkand told RFE/RL that about 15 trucks of Iranian dairy products used to arrive daily via Turkmenistan – that flow has now stopped. Iran held roughly 8-10 percent of Uzbekistan’s dairy import market, competing on price with Russian and Belarusian suppliers.

The broader economic picture is grim. Global oil prices have surged past $100 a barrel, with Brent crude briefly hitting $119.50 as Iran’s de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz disrupted roughly 20 percent of global oil supplies. For oil-importing Central Asian countries like Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, higher energy prices feed directly into inflation and transport costs. Kazakhstan, as an oil exporter, may see stronger export revenues in the short term, but that gain comes with volatility and rising import costs across the board.

Iran’s role in Central Asia’s trade geography extends well beyond food. The landlocked republics have long viewed Iranian ports as a gateway to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean – a critical alternative to northern corridors controlled by Russia and China. That southern route is now inaccessible. Uzbekistan, which routes 60 percent of its European and Turkish transit through Iran, has already ordered a search for alternatives, with attention turning to Caspian Sea routes and the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, also known as the Middle Corridor.

Diplomatically, the Central Asian governments are walking a familiar tightrope. All five foreign ministries issued statements calling for restraint and political resolution, but none named the United States or Israel as the initiators of the military operation. This studied neutrality is complicated by the fact that just a week before the strikes, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan sent their presidents to Washington to join U.S. President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace initiative. Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon, whose relationship with Iran runs deeper than the region’s other leaders owing to the two countries’ shared Persianate heritage, reportedly sent personal condolences to Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian over the death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

Central Asian governments are also scrambling to protect their citizens. Kazakhstan is working on evacuation measures for nationals in escalation zones, advising citizens in Iran to seek overland exits through Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. Tajik nationals have already been among those crossing into Azerbaijan via the Astara border crossing.

If the conflict is short-lived, the economic damage may remain manageable. But if fighting drags on and Iran’s southern corridors remain closed, the consequences for Central Asia will compound. The region’s food import dependency, limited trade route alternatives, and economic fragility – particularly in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan – leave little margin for a prolonged disruption. The war in Iran has laid bare a structural vulnerability that years of multi-vector diplomacy did not resolve: for all its efforts to diversify, Central Asia’s economic survival still hinges on the stability of its neighbors.