The Diplomat author Mercy Kuo regularly engages subject-matter experts, policy practitioners, and strategic thinkers across the globe for their diverse insights into U.S. Asia policy. This conversation with Verineia Codrean – chief strategy and partnerships officer at EUROATLAS, the Bremen-based company building the world’s longest-endurance autonomous underwater vehicle (AUV), GREYSHARK – is the 526th in “The Trans-Pacific View Insight Series.”

Explain why the China-U.S. naval race may increasingly depend on who controls the underwater operating landscape.

I would use the word “understands” rather than “controls.” No country can fully control such a vast and difficult environment. But the side that can map it, monitor activity persistently, communicate underwater, and turn sensor data into decisions faster will gain a significant operational advantage. The underwater landscape affects submarine movement, anti-submarine warfare, mine warfare, and the security of critical infrastructure, so situational awareness below the surface is becoming central to maritime power.

How might China’s expanding underwater reach undermine U.S. maritime dominance?

Greater underwater reach can complicate U.S. and allied operations by making submarines, ports, sea lanes, and critical infrastructure harder to protect. Persistent sensing and autonomous systems could extend surveillance over much larger areas and increase uncertainty for an opponent. But reach alone does not equal dominance: effectiveness depends on sensor quality, communications, data fusion, logistics, and the ability to operate reliably in complex environments.

In what ways is Taiwan a preview of deniable, below-threshold disruption in the China-U.S. naval race?

Taiwan illustrates the difficulty of distinguishing accidents, commercial activity and deliberate coercion at sea. Cable damage, vessels operating under flags of convenience, ambiguous ownership, and activity near sensitive infrastructure can create disruption without producing immediate, conclusive attribution. That ambiguity is strategically useful because it delays both political and operational responses. However, individual incidents should not be presented as deliberate state action unless the evidence supports that conclusion.

Analyze why underwater autonomy is becoming crucial for detecting, monitoring, and attributing threats below the surface.

The central problem underwater is persistence. Ships and crewed aircraft can only monitor limited areas for limited periods, while fixed sensors cannot cover every route or depth. Autonomous systems can extend presence, revisit anomalies, and collect data over time. That helps distinguish a one-off event from a pattern of behavior and can strengthen attribution. But autonomy does not solve attribution by itself: evidence still has to be combined with vessel tracking, acoustic data, intelligence and legal assessment.

Assess the top three trends in underwater intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and their implications for risk management in maritime chokepoints, such as the Taiwan Strait, Strait of Malacca, and Strait of Hormuz, among others.

1. Persistence: navies are moving from occasional patrols toward continuous coverage using autonomous vehicles and distributed sensors. For chokepoints, that improves early warning but also increases the number of contacts and false alarms that operators must manage.
2. Sensor fusion: Underwater acoustic data is increasingly combined with satellite imagery, vessel tracking, airborne surveillance, and intelligence sources. This can improve attribution, but poor-quality or incomplete data can also produce false confidence.
3. Faster sensor-to-decision cycles through onboard processing and AI. Systems will increasingly identify anomalies and prioritize what humans need to examine. That can shorten response times, but governments must establish clear thresholds for escalation because rapid detection is not the same as reliable attribution.

One important geographic distinction I want to highlight is that the risk is not identical across all chokepoints. The Taiwan Strait is primarily shaped by military and grey-zone competition; Malacca combines strategic rivalry with extreme commercial density; Hormuz combines state confrontation, energy security, and asymmetric threats. The technology may be similar, but the rules for interpreting and responding to an underwater contact must differ.

Underwater advantage will not belong simply to the country with the most platforms. It will belong to the side that can maintain persistent awareness, interpret ambiguous activity, and turn reliable data into proportionate decisions fastest.