On October 19, Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev awarded U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio the Order of Outstanding Merit. On October 20, UzDaily reported the arrival of Russian troops for joint military exercises in Uzbekistan. For Karakalpak families awaiting the release of political prisoners, neither announcement offered relief. Uzbekistan celebrated American investment and welcomed Russian soldiers while making no publicly announced commitment to people imprisoned for exercising and defending their rights.

Mirziyoyev’s office announced $12 billion in agreements, while Rubio participated in the C5+1 ministerial meeting and witnessed Uzbekistan’s signing of the Artemis Accords on peaceful space exploration. Sustained American engagement with Central Asia serves legitimate interests, and investment can create opportunities across the region. But announced agreements must still become functioning projects.

The more immediate political benefit went to Mirziyoyev, who received the public appreciation of America’s top diplomat. Rubio wrote that he was “deeply honored to be awarded the Order of Outstanding Merit by President Mirziyoyev” on X. The public results of the visit offered no hint of discussion on Karakalpak prisoners or accountability for the July 2022 massacre in Karakalpakstan.

The Russian exercises make it harder to mistake American access for a strategic shift in Tashkent. According to UzDaily, citing Russia’s Central Military District, servicemen from the 201st Guards Military Base – a Russian base in Tajikistan – arrived for Hamkorlik-2026, scheduled for October 20-27 in Uzbekistan. The report described the participation of assault units, reconnaissance and strike drones, robotic systems, and Mi-24 helicopters. These drills need not have been organized as a message to Washington to illustrate Tashkent’s position. Uzbekistan could welcome an American secretary of state and Russian military personnel in the same week without treating either relationship as a concession to the other.

Mirziyoyev had already explained that position in his own words. During an October 7 birthday call with Putin, he praised the Russian president’s “historic role” in modern Russia and his contribution to their countries’ “comprehensive strategic partnership and alliance.” That same day, he received a delegation led by Denis Manturov to advance cooperation in industry, energy, metallurgy, nuclear energy, and industrial zones. Earlier, Putin had authorized negotiations to amend military-technical agreements with Uzbekistan. RFE/RL reported in August that the proposed changes remained undisclosed. 

Uzbekistan has been equally adept at cultivating other partners. Mirziyoyev signed the charter of President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace in January. His Interior Ministry has described cooperation with Huawei, including plans for “intelligent video surveillance.” In September, an institute under the Agriculture Ministry announced a memorandum with Iran’s Sirang UAV covering agricultural drone training and service centers. That agreement concerns agricultural applications and does not establish military cooperation or imply sanctions evasion, but it does illustrate a developing relationship. Washington should judge its own successes by the commitments it obtains, rather than assume that a warm reception will translate into influence.

The commercial relationship requires the same scrutiny. In April, the EU imposed sanctions on Uzbek companies over their Russia links, citing cotton-cellulose supplies to Russian gunpowder manufacturers. Those findings give U.S. officials concrete reasons to insist on rigorous screening of counterparties, beneficial ownership, and supply chains before promoting investment. Uzbekistan’s political system presents additional concerns: Freedom House rates it “Not Free,” with a score of 12 out of 100, while the Human Rights Foundation classifies it as a fully authoritarian regime. Freedom House reports that no opposition parties operate legally and that the legislature and judiciary effectively serve the executive.

American investors have encountered the consequences of weak institutional protections before. In 2006, Newmont disclosed approximately $48 million in tax claims against its Uzbek joint venture despite written confirmation from Uzbekistan’s Justice Ministry that a relevant tax decree applied for the venture’s lifetime. Access to the venture’s bank accounts was restricted, its assets placed under legal restraint, and bankruptcy proceedings initiated. A 2007 settlement provided for $80 million in payments and the transfer of Newmont’s interest to Uzbek parties, without an admission of liability. These events occurred when Shavkat Mirziyoyev was Uzbekistan’s prime minister.

The OECD’s 2025 investment review identifies continuing concerns about executive influence over courts, inconsistent decisions in technically complex cases, and overlapping rules that undermine predictability. Investors therefore have reason to ask whether commitments will survive a change of leadership, a reshuffle of influential officials, or a dispute involving politically connected interests. Official assurances offer limited protection unless institutions can enforce them.

The U.S. also has a strategic lesson to remember. After the May 2005 Andijan crackdown, the United States supported calls for an independent international investigation. That July, Uzbekistan ordered American forces out of the Karshi-Khanabad airbase, which supported operations in Afghanistan. Years of security cooperation failed to preserve American access once accountability became a source of bilateral tension. If Washington now avoids difficult questions to protect its agreements, Tashkent again holds considerable leverage over the relationship.

For Karakalpak people, those questions are urgent. Dauletmurat Tajimuratov, a Karakalpak lawyer and journalist, received a 16-year sentence after opposing proposed constitutional changes affecting the Sovereign Republic of Karakalpakstan’s status. The United Nations Working Group on Arbitrary Detention found his imprisonment arbitrary and called for his immediate release. Another two and a half years were added to his sentence this year. Before Rubio’s visit,  Kaitie Holland and Sergei Korotkov, both international legal associates at the Human Rights Foundation, urged him in an article published by Just Security to demand freedom for Uzbekistan’s political prisoners, detailing Tajimuratov’s reported beatings, degrading prison conditions, and attempts to force him to renounce his Karakalpak identity.

In June, U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer reaffirmed strong support for Uzbekistan’s World Trade Organization (WTO) accession. Further discretionary benefits should accompany published commitments on prisoner protection, accountability, and predictable legal treatment. Washington should press for Tajimuratov’s release, independent medical and monitoring access pending release, and an independent international investigation into the 2022 massacre. Independent courts and limits on executive interference would also protect the American businesses the administration is encouraging to invest.

Tashkent played its hand well. Mirziyoyev secured American recognition and commercial support while strengthening ties with Russia and maintaining an iron grip at home. Rubio must now explain what Washington obtained in return. Until commercial promises become enforceable commitments and American influence helps secure freedom for political prisoners, the medal around Rubio’s neck offers clearer evidence of Mirziyoyev’s diplomatic success than America’s.